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Abstract
In 1971, Taiwan lost its seat in the United Nations and has been vying for international
validation ever since. The Kuomintang’s (KMT) loss and the development of Taiwan’s
democracy has left millions with varying opinions pertaining to the status of Taiwan. It also
brings up the importance of what it means to be Taiwanese and how Taiwanese people identify
and distinguish themselves from China. For much of the Republic of China’s (ROC) existence in
Taiwan the independence movement for the de facto nation-state has lived outside of its borders,
making achievements and enduring hardships for Taiwan and Taiwanese Americans throughout
Taiwan’s continuous struggles to find its place in our globalizing world.
It brings into question the sense of Taiwanese identity in Taiwanese Americans,
especially those raised outside of martial law and whose parents have lived in both the martial
law era and post-martial law era. For young professionals and students of Taiwanese American
descent, what do they vie for when retaining intergenerational beliefs on language and
independence, their attachments and thoughts about the island, their transnationality, and the
commonalities and differences that Taiwanese Americans and Taiwanese inhabitants have? This
thesis aims to contribute to discourse on Asian Americans, specifically addressing Taiwanese
Americans, their identity in America and in Taiwan, issues pertaining to Cross-Strait
relationships, its effect on Taiwanese Americans, and to help understand the importance of
Taiwanese people in America. Taiwanese Americans point out several historical, ethnolinguistic,
and political differences when talking about their identity and relationship with Taiwan.
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Chapter One: The Development of Taiwan, the Diaspora, and its Identity
The Broad Importance of Asian Americans, Specifically Taiwanese Americans
Before exploring the dilemma that Taiwan and Taiwanese Americans face, one must look
at the larger context of Asian American history and their importance in American society, then
more closely look at the historical impacts of Taiwanese Americans. Often forgotten in talks
about race and ethnicity, Asians and Asian Americans are the fast growing minority group in the
U.S. and play a vital role in America’s political, economic, and social atmosphere. Former
Florida Republican governor Jeb Bush once called the Asian Americans a “Canary in a Coal
Mine” for the republican ticket (Chow, 2016). It puts into focus that Asian Americans have often
been overlooked in American society even though they are an important bloc of people. With
Asian Americans in general being over looked, Taiwanese Americans are even more
underrepresented in American society. The growth of the Asian American population has been
exponential in recent years. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, since 2000 there has been a 43
percent increase in those who identified as Asian alone while there was another 46 percent
increase in those who identified as Asian and another race. Even though Asian Americans are a
growing group, compared to other minority groups, studies and research on Asian Americans is
lacking, especially on young Asian Americans (Kiang, Tseng, & Yip, 2016). The stories and
identities of Asian Americans are often lost to American society as these different ethnic groups
are often lumped into this larger Pan-Asian idea, a detriment to pan-ethnic development of
America. Being bunched into a general Pan-Asian identity leaves out the important historical
backgrounds in which these different ethnic groups came under. It is also unpleasant for
Taiwanese Americans as they are often mistakenly generalized with Chinese identity. The blind
combination of these identities also lead to a lack of understanding in the differences in various
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Asian groups. Though often generalized, Asian Americans hold a unique place in America’s
racial hierarchy.
Asian Americans and Asian immigrants are often seen as ethnically assimilatable, tended
to be highly skilled workers, and are often compared to their white counterparts in terms of
socioeconomic standards, but are still often looked at as foreign and inferior in America’s racial
hierarchy (Kim, 1999; Jimenez & Horowitz, 2013). Asian Americans and their ancestors are
becoming an interesting subject of study as they diverge from the ideas of white and black
America and are just one of many reminders of the pan-ethnic diversity instituted in the U.S.
Asian immigrants and Asian Americans are an interesting group of people due to their place in
America’s racial hierarchy, the groups extensive population growth, and their contribution to the
U.S. economy as many are highly educated and highly skilled. Often stereotyped in the U.S. as
the “model minority,” a term conceived in 1966 by University of California, Berkeley sociologist
William Petersen to describe Japanese Americans, Asian Americans have maintained an
intriguing socioeconomic status in a place where racial tensions continue to escalate. Asian
Americans in the past have not always had this “model minority” narrative placed on them as the
U.S. has a history of discriminating against Asians in America. Though often forgotten about in
racial issues and school textbooks, Asian Americans have a long history in U.S. society. Asian
Americans challenge the idea of white America, the superiority of “whiteness,” and the
socioeconomic class status often placed on minorities, while also changing the standards in terms
of academics and success (Jimenez & Horowitz, 2013).
Specifically, Taiwanese Americans have a special place in Pan-Asian identity and
diasporic community. Taiwanese Americans are one of the most educated minority groups in
America with 67% of Taiwanese Americans having received their bachelors, and are a key factor

2

in the narrative of Asian American acceptance in the U.S (Kiang et al., 2016; Hsu, 2012). It is
impossible to know who exactly was the first Taiwanese person to enter the U.S. since
Taiwanese people share parts of their history with the Japanese and Chinese, though they are a
major factor in the change in U.S. immigration laws because of the ROCs former diplomatic
relationship with the U.S. as will be explained in a later section. Taiwan’s relationship with the
U.S. takes many turns and is unique in its identity development as native Taiwanese and
Taiwanese Americans try to distinguish themselves from China. As history has displayed and
past activists are aware, Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans must continue to push for selfdetermination, independence, and seek out recognition, whether formal or informal, from various
avenues as the Taiwanese government continues to pursue active participation in global affairs.
The status quo of Taiwan and China’s currently peaceful but tense political relationship will not
hold forever. China has already made its intentions clear that I will attempt to take Taiwan by
force if necessary. If and when that day comes, will America really be there to aid in Taiwan’s
struggle, or will the nation once again be subject to America’s own strategic interest, a topic that
will be touched on in this chapter. Taiwanese Americans will continue to have a hand in shaping
the Taiwanese diaspora and the multiple layers of identity in Taiwan. To help understand the
geopolitical issue Taiwan faces and the historical development of Taiwanese identity, the
remainder of this chapter will focus briefly on Asia American history then more broadly on
Taiwanese and Taiwanese American history, culture, and their collective relationship with the
U.S. Following the end of this chapter will be a chapter on methods. The subsequent chapter
explores data gathered on Taiwanese Americans. And final chapter of this thesis will focus on
discussions and possible future research. In order to understand the scope of Taiwan’s place in
America, one should be reminded of Asian American history and its development.
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Taiwanese singularities that have formed out of Taiwanese and American History
The Pan-Asian diaspora throughout the world is large as many Asians have left their
ancestral homelands in order to evade conflict and persecution, to pursue better opportunities for
themselves and their families, or were forced to leave as slaves and indentured servants.
Different waves of Asian migrants have come to the U.S. through numerous channels and for
various reasons, and until recently the history behind their moves to the U.S. and the challenges
that Asian Americans faced were hardly mentioned and in many cases still underexplored or
misrepresented (Ngai, 2006; Kiang et al., 2016; An, 2016). Asian American stories vary from
one ethnic group to another and is often part of what defines them when their ancestors left their
homeland. In a nation where race continues to be a sensitive issue, it is crucial to understand the
history of the issue and unpack the embedded problems that have caused continuous hardship so
that others may build a more inclusive society for the future. In this context, the hardship is
between Taiwanese Americans and their Chinese counterparts. The Cross-Strait relationship is a
historical issue that implicates the lives of Taiwanese Americans on international and domestic
scales. In order to understand the embedded struggle for Taiwanese Americans we must consider
the seldom explored history of Asian Americans and Taiwan’s own history in comparison to
China.
Taiwan has gone through the hands of multiple colonizers throughout its recorded history.
Taiwan is an interesting case of multi-faceted development from a score of different actors that
have left their imprint on the islands identity. This leads to distinct characteristics in Taiwan that
are unique from the Chinese narrative that is given to the island nation. The layers of identity in
Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans are many as they incorporate a multi-colonial past,
ethnolinguistic differences, and continual political development. In looking at Taiwanese history,

4

the original inhibitors of the island were not primarily of Han Chinese decent.1 The original
inhibitors of the island were heavily effected by Western influence in East Asia. The first
dominant form of Western influence came to Taiwan in 1624 at the hands of the Dutch empire,
though the Spanish were briefly there as well. Initially named Formosa by the Dutch, Taiwan
was set up as trading post for Chinese silk with the vast potential of becoming a colony to
produce sugar, deer hide, rice, and venison (Andrade, 2006). After the great maritime expedition
conduct by Zheng He during the Ming dynasty was over, the Ming government was not keen on
maritime trade and travel, but was more focused on protecting its harbors (Huang, 2016),
therefore China’s government at the time was not heavily interested in overseas colonies.
Though this was the case, Dutch occupation was essential to the initial Sinification of Taiwan as
the Dutch government needed cheap labor to capitalize on the islands economic potential.
Though Taiwan is about 100 miles from China’s Fujian province, the Chinese did not
effectively colonize and annex the island prior to Dutch occupation. Though small amounts of
Chinese people from Fujian and Guangdong had migrated to Taiwan since the 13th century
(Zhong, 2016), Taiwan was mainly inhabited by a diverse array of Austronesian aboriginal
societies. One of the biggest deterrents for migration to Taiwan at the time was due to the fact
that all of the aboriginal tribes ritualistically practiced headhunting (Simon, 2012). Though the
Dutch knew this was a problem, they still needed a labor force to tend to the land they were
trying to cultivate. In order to solve this problem, the Dutch recruited poor famers out of
Southern China to work in Taiwan with the promise of land, four years of tax-free harvest, and
protection from Taiwanese aboriginals (Andrade, 2006).
1

Han Chinese are one of the 56 ethnic groups found in China and have several sub-ethnic groups.
The Han ethnic group accounts for with of 91.6% China’s population (CIA World Fact Book,
2016). A majority of Taiwan’s population is ancestrally of Han decent. Other often mentioned
ethnic groups in China are Tibetans, Uighurs, and Manchurians.
5

Without much interest and interference from China or Japan and the help of cheap
Chinese labor, the Dutch were able to successfully establish their trading post and held their
position on the island from 1624 until they were driven out by Ming Dynasty loyalists in 1662
(Gao, 2010). The Ming loyalists had fled to Taiwan after losing power to the ethnic Manchu
people from northern China and the rulers of the Qing dynasty. The Ming loss led to the flight of
thousands of Chinese, mainly from Fujian and Guangdong, to Taiwan and effectively removed
the Dutch colonizers in 1662 (Andrade, 2006). From 1662 until 1683, Taiwan was a Ming
loyalist stronghold controlled by the Zheng family. Led by a half-Japanese half-Chinese man,
Koxinga was a powerful sea lord who used his father’s network to gain control of Taiwan and
coordinated attacks on the coast of Fujian (Ho, 2013).2 The influx of Ming loyalist also altered
the language ecology and cultural landscape of the island as Chinese Confucianism, traditions,
customs, and Holo was firmly established on the island through their establishment of schools.3
Holo, the linguistic predecessor of modern Taiwanese, has its origins in southern China and was
spoken by Koxinga and many of his followers, but it, like Taiwan’s history, bifurcated as it
incorporated bits of the Dutch and Aboriginal lexicon (Wu, 2009). It was only when the Ming
loyalists gave way to the Qing dynasty did Taiwan and China converge. The historical context of
these events make Taiwan’s ancient history different from that of China’s.
Taiwan, for the first time in its history, was annexed by China and the Qing dynasty in
1683 and was set up as a subsidiary of Fujian (Ho, 2013), thus divulging from the common
history often mentioned when incorporating Taiwan into China. It was not until the
establishment of China’s last dynasty did Taiwan ever become part of China. Mandarin Chinese
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Koxinga was known as also known as Zheng Chenggong.
Holo is also known as Hokkien, Hoklo, or Southern Min. The language and origin of these
people are from the Southern Chinese province of Fujian.
3
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was introduced to Taiwan by the Qing dynasty but the language never took a strong hold on the
island during Qing control as language and emigration policies to the island were not strongly
enforced. This allowed many migrants from Fujian and Guangdong to move to Taiwan and the
eventual establishment of Holo (now to be referred to as Taiwanese or Tai-yü) to be the
dominant language and ethnic group on the island (Chen, 2006).
For a majority of the Qing dynasty’s rule, Taiwan was ignored due to its physical
separation from mainland China. Eventually, Taiwan started receiving interest and attention for
its natural resources by neighboring countries, mainly Japan, causing the Qing dynasty to make
investments on the island and made it a province in 1885 (Wu, 2009). Though Taiwan was part
of China for little over two centuries, the island received relatively little attention from China
before being transferred to the Imperial Japan in 1895 and a subject that is explored further later
in this chapter. In less than two decades after Japan’s acquisition, the Qing dynasty fell which
ushered in a new era in China. The Kuomintang (KMT) and the Republic of China (ROC) was
established in China in 1911 after the fall of the Qing dynasty (Dirlik & Prazniak, 2011), at
which point Taiwan was a Japanese colony. The most celebrated figure, prominent in China and
Taiwan, to come out of its establishment was Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who has also been called “the
father of the nation” (Dirlik & Prazniak, 2011). He was an essential part to overthrowing the
Qing dynasty in the 1911 Chinese Revolution and served as the KMT president. While Taiwan
and China were going through historical changes, America was beginning to establish its
dominance as a Western power, a component in the narrative of Taiwan’s history and people.
In understanding Taiwan’s position in history we must also explore the history of Asians
in America up until WWII and the Cold War, which is when Taiwan and the U.S not only
become intertwined in a geopolitical quagmire that is still a flashpoint today, but a shift in the
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way the U.S. viewed and treated Asian Americans. The Western world has long had an interest
with the East but the treatment of Asians by their Western counterparts had hardly been
reciprocal when Asians came to America. Tales of Eastern riches and wonder are recounted in
the stories of Europeans such as Marco Polo and it was Christopher Columbus who mistakenly
stumbled upon North America as he searched for a route to Asia. Only when Asians came to the
West in hopes of better economic opportunities were Asians shunned or exploited. The PanAsian diaspora dates back before the establishment of the U.S. The Spanish had a large hand in
spreading people and goods throughout their empire with Manila, Philippines at the center of
their Pacific network and connecting their trans-Pacific empire. Thousands of Asian sailors’
slaves were transported to Spain’s empire in Mexico through channels in Manila to maintain its
labor force. Collectively known as Los Chinos, these were the first recorded Asians to reach the
Americas (E. Lee, 2015). Throughout the next several centuries a variety of Asian ethnicities
will have joined the Pan-Asian Diaspora, reaching various places in the world. It is important to
understand this because Asian migration to the America’s can be traced back to the colonial era
and the history of Asian Americans is often confused or associated with the wrong group.
Interest in China and the Eastern world was also evident in the U.S. when it became an
independent nation in 1776, beginning trade with China and the rest of the Eastern world quickly
after their declaration. In America’s early stages of development, the government had clear
interest in establishing trade with China, sending boats full of ginseng, coats, and furs and
returning from their mission successfully yielding Chinese silk, tea, porcelain, amongst other
goods from Asia (E. Lee, 2015). Chinese immigrants began to arrive in the U.S. during the early
19th century in search of better economic opportunities. Known as coolies, unskilled labors from
China and South Asia were brought to the U.S. and the East Indies for cheap labor (E. Lee, 2015).
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Records of these labors were not well kept and many did not make the journey across the Pacific.
The first recorded Chinese person in the U.S. was a woman, Afong Moy, who arrived in 1834 (E.
Lee, 2015). Not long after her arrival, China was going into an era of disarray causing millions to
flee for better opportunities. At this time, China’s military was weak, the state had been battered
by numerous natural disasters, refused embrace the advancements and technologies of the
Industrial Revolution, felt pressure from the West and Japan, and the population was growing at
a Malthusian pace. These issues led to a Chinese state that was crippled by opium addiction, a
slew of futile wars, poverty, sociopolitical unrest, and semi-colonization; all of which helped
contribute to the eventual fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 (J. Lee 2015). This time period is
important for Taiwanese Americans because the recorded migration of people who possibly
came from Taiwan to the U.S. prior to the KMTs lose in the Chinese civil war could be
categorized under Chinese immigration or Japanese immigration when it was the countries
colony. Taiwanese immigration history is shared with Chinese and Japanese Americans until the
end of WWII, which will be explored later in this section
Chinese immigrants started to flee China in large numbers during the 1840s in pursuit of
better economic situation and in a span of six decades, about two and a half million people left
China to establish lives throughout various regions of the world. A majority of the Chinese that
came to America at this time hailed from China’s southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong
and settled in the states of California, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington in their quest to find
“Gold Mountain” during the U.S. gold rush. The Chinese were allured by the potential of finding
gold and riches, but many subsequently found themselves working labor intensive jobs, such as
railroad construction, coal mining, and fishing. Regardless, the amount of Chinese coming to the
U.S. increased and the establishment of Chinatowns began to arise (J. Lee, 2015). Large Asian
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populations in the U.S. have traditionally been found in cities such as San Francisco, Chicago,
and New York City, where Asian groups came and settled, but this is changing as pockets of
Asian American populations are emerging in cities that they did not traditionally inhabit, such as
Las Vegas, Atlanta, Houston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, but are home to other large, diverse
immigration populations (E. Lee, 2015).
Though Asians have been living and working in the U.S. since the late 18th century, they
have not always been welcomed in the U.S. It is no secret that America has implemented
oppressive laws since its colonial period that have fundamentally constructed a racial hierarchy
that still proves to be a problematic affair in today’s society (Ngai, 2004). Like many other racial
groups in the U.S., Asians were discriminated and marginalized by Whites in the 19th century
and throughout half of the 20th century and still face racial issues today, though not as blatant and
exclusive as the past. Racially biased laws limited and barred the Asians of America from
entering, participating, and qualifying for the benefits of U.S. mainstream society. In 1790, the
U.S. implemented its first Naturalization Act, which excluded rights to many immigrants by only
granting citizenship to free whites (J. Lee, 2015). These disparities were exacerbated even further
for Chinese immigrants and later placed on other Pan-Asian immigrants as well. Anti-Asian
sentiment had risen in the U.S., unfortunately similar to how there is anti-Muslim sentiment now.
Discriminatory laws, such as the Foreign Miner’s Tax of 1852, and duel wages system were
implemented because white men in California did not like the presence that the Chinese had in
the job sector, leading to the unfair taxing and lower wages for the Chinese laborers (J. Lee,
2015). Laws and practices such as these only became worse as Chinese immigrants began
moving to urban centers and taking on industrial jobs.
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Anti-Chinese sentiment had escalated to a new low that further alienated the Chinese in
the U.S. Those who were anti-Chinese perceived the Chinese to be unassimilable and also
believed “that Chinese men were seen as working too hard for less pay than white labor and
saving too much and spending too little for the benefit of China over the USA” (Kil, 2012, p. 664)
and were blamed for taking white American jobs. Chinese women were also specifically targeted
because they were seen as immoral and lewd and were eventually barred from coming into the
U.S. through the Page Act passed in 1875 (Lee, 2010). Less than a decade later on May 6th, 1882,
U.S. President Chester A. Arthur passed the Chinese Exclusion Act (CEA). The CEA prevented
the entrance of Chinese laborers, regardless of their skillset. For the first time in U.S. history a
whole category of immigrants was denied entry solely based on their race and required the
Chinese living in the U.S. to register with authorities and carry identification at all times (Kil,
2012). The CEA was only meant to last 10 years but was extended for an additional 10 years
when Congress passed the Geary Act in 1892 and was indefinitely extended in 1904. In addition
to the CEA, Congress had passed the Immigration Act of 1917, which in effect created a “barred
Asiatic zone” (Ngai, 2004, p. 18). Though it was illegal for Chinese immigrants to come to the
U.S. it did not stop them. An estimated 17,300 Chinese came to the U.S. through illegal channels
in Mexico and Canada between 1882 and 1920 (Lee, 2002).
The U.S. quota system was implemented in 1921 under the Emergency Immigration Act,
which limited immigration admission to 355,825 people that year. Allotment of the quotas was
based on the U.S. populations national origin, with each group receiving 3 percent of what their
population numbers were in the 1910 U.S. census (Ngai, 2004). The combined 1921 and 1922
allotment of quotas for “other Asia” only totaled out to be 152, a mere .0002 percent of the total
quotas given (Massey, 2015). This system was continued under the Immigration Act of 1924,
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which further constructed a racial bias for Western and Northern Europeans and the exclusion of
any population the U.S. thought was unfit (Ngai, 2004). Immigration laws that were
discriminatory toward Asians and Asian Americans would continue to be upheld until WWII
when the U.S. and ROC were allies in war, but changes in law were most noticeable when the
Cold War between the U.S. and USSR started and where Taiwan emerged to become a shrouded
topic in the discourse pertaining to immigration in the U.S.
The immigration history of Chinese and Taiwanese people to the U.S. vary, along with
the history of Taiwan during America’s CEA era. During the CEA era and prior to and with the
establishment of the Republic of China, Taiwan’s history has been one of divergence. Since the
Opium Wars took place in China, Taiwan’s history takes a turn from the history shared with the
rest of China. Taiwan’s shared history and identity with China begins to change significantly in
1895, per the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China ceded Taiwan to Japan after China had
lost the first Sino-Japanese war. Interestingly, local leaders in Taiwan had attempted to declare
independence when Japan won by establishing the Republic of Taiwan, which only lasted ten
days (Copper, 2003). For 50 years, Taiwan was incorporated into Imperial Japan as one of its
colonies and through time became loyal subjects to the Japanese empire. It was also a period
where immigration from China to Taiwan had been halted and Taiwan had been cut off from the
political and cultural developments taking place in China (Gold, 1985). During this time of
revolution and KMT establishment in China, the people of Taiwan were being turned into
subject of Imperial Japan through the enforcement of various policies. During Japanese
occupation, Taiwan went through a transformation that was both beneficial and detrimental to
those inhabiting the island. With ideas of modernization and free education in mind, Japan had
even been wary about keeping Taiwan as a colony so much so that it was rumored to be
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interested in selling Taiwan to France (Noruma, 2010). Though financially burdensome for Japan,
the rumor remained a rumor and Taiwanese people benefited from Japanese colonization.
Japanese policy helped launch Taiwan towards modernization and made Taiwan a more
economically productive, sanitary, and educated colony (Copper, 2003).
Though beneficial for Taiwanese people, these policies would also create problems in the
future when the KMT established control of the island. Though lenient at first with the
Taiwanese language (Wu, 2009), the Japanization policies would leave a whole generation of
Taiwanese to be solely educated in the Japanese language, with about 70 percent of those in
school speaking Japanese towards the end of colonization, and an upbringing in Japanese culture
(Weis & Dolby, 2012). Even though the Taiwanese-Japanese were treated unequally, feelings
towards Japan are still deep, especially amongst the elite who had spent time in Japan and
received their education in Japan. One of Taiwan’s former president, Lee Tung-hui, is an
example of an elite class of Taiwanese who cherish the relationship Taiwan and Japan had
(Zhang, 2009). A form of Japanese identity is embedded in Taiwan as highlighted by the fact that
the Japanese identity that was imposed on Taiwanese people had covered all socioeconomic
statuses in Taiwan, as found in the political elite, such as President Lee, and in commoners who
were educated under the Japanese system. It also serves as a differentiation in Chinese and
Taiwanese identity and the identity differences in benshengren and waishengren, two terms that
will be explained later in this paper.
Japan’s colonization was unlike the European form of colonization in Africa and Latin
America. At the time, Japan was the only imperial power in the East, but it was still not as
economically influential as its Western counterparts. Taiwan was not left with the same problems
that many European colonies had, such as ethnic conflict, dire economic hardships, and post-
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colonial relationships between the colonized and colonizer. This may be due to the fact that
Japan was rapidly removed from Taiwan after their defeat in World War II and the fact that the
KMT had installed an authoritarian regime soon after Japan’s departure. The KMT also garnered
support from the U.S. government as they confronted communism. It was not until the end of
World War II did China regain possession of the island. As pointed out by George Kerr (1965), a
former U.S. diplomat to Taiwan, the ROC had acquired the island through the Cairo Declaration,
signed by allied forces towards the end of WWII. At the time, Japan had modernized Taiwan’s
economy and raised the standard of living to a level that surpassed many of those living in China.
The reunification between the China and Taiwan was short-lived as China’s internal political
issues escalated into a civil war between the Nationalist KMT party and the Mao Zedong led
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The KMT had controlled China from 1911 until 1949, when
the KMT was ultimately forced out after losing the civil war. With the loss came the
establishment of the communist led People’s Republic of China (PRC). The KMT fled to Taiwan
to re-establish its government and prepared for the day they would retake China, though this day
never came.
Not long after the KMTs acquisition of Taiwan but prior to the KMTs exodus from China,
the 228 Incident occurred. During this incident thousands of Taiwanese people were killed or
injured as they protested KMT governance. The U.S., who agreed to the Cairo Declaration, did
nothing to stop this from happening, which was a detriment to Taiwanese people as scores of
people would later die from the proceeding results of martial law in a new era of Sino-American
diplomacy. The 228 incident and martial law were never stopped by the U.S. because of their
relationship with the KMT government and the ROCs geopolitically significant effort to contain
communism. The ROCs relationship with America developed as they became allies during
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WWII, which subsequently led to the end of the CEA in 1942. After the CEA was lifted the U.S.
had allowed the KMT to send students, technical trainees, diplomats, and military personal from
various parts of China to universities throughout the U.S., which would become an avenue for
Taiwanese people to come to the U.S. after the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War. This would
leave thousands of students left to pursue their careers in the U.S. instead of China.
The KMT did not only leave thousands of students stranded in the U.S., but also caused
shift in Taiwan’s population. As mentioned earlier, the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War in 1949,
causing Chiang Kai-shek and his followers to flee to Taiwan. Millions fled to Taiwan and caused
a fourth category in Taiwan’s population. The three original categories were Hokkien, Hakka,
and Aboriginals and were in Taiwan for many generations (benshengren), and the fourth
category being post-1949 Mainlanders (waishengren) from China. The literal translation of
benshengren is ‘this province people’ and is associated with native Taiwanese people who came
from the original three categories. Waishengren on the other hand literally translate into
‘foreigner’ or ‘outside province people’ and is associated with the post-1949 immigrants. The
Hokkien ethnic group are historically from Southern China and make up a majority, about 70
percent, of the population in Taiwan and are the ethnic group typically associated with being
Taiwanese and the Taiwanese language. The Hakka ethnic group, also known as Kejia ren or
‘guest people’ migrated from Northern to Southern China throughout different historical time
periods, often speaking their own language and Taiwanese as well, they make up about 15
percent of Taiwan’s population. The post-1949 Mainlanders make up about 13 percent of the
population, while the aboriginal population makes up about 2 percent of the population (Wilson,
2009). It is important to distinguish between the various ethnic groups because KMT policies
effected them all as the KMT imposed their idea of what they believed China should be.
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Multiple identities are found in the Taiwan, specifically when it pertains to
ethnolinguistic and political differences, which is still relevant in Taiwan now. The overall
identity of Taiwan began to shift again as the KMT established their monopolistic power on the
island. The KMT was keen on the Sinification, or the incorporation of Chinese culture and
loyalty, of Taiwanese people (Lynch, 2008). Since the KMT focused on a Chinese identity,
language became one of the central identity markers and became a significant part of the KMTs
policies. The KMT had made it a point to make Mandarin the national language of the ROC.
This was due to the fact that KMT members came from various regions of China, speaking
different dialects depending on which region they hailed from, so though Mandarin was not
every KMT members first language it serves as their common language (Liu, 2012). It should be
noted that the written Mandarin used in China differs from that found in Taiwan. Chinese
Mandarin uses simplified characters whereas Taiwanese Mandarin uses traditional characters.4
Knowing that Japanization was firmly embedded in Taiwan, the KMT used language to deJapanize Taiwan while also promoting a Sinification of the island. Those who used languages
other than Mandarin were often punished for using these languages in public. Former Taiwanese
president Lee Tung-hui, who was also Taiwan’s first Taiwan-born leader and also of Hakka
decent, has voiced his concern over this issue in the past stating in an interview:
Having lived under different regimes, from Japanese colonialism to Taiwan’s recovery, I
have greatly experienced the miseries of the Taiwanese people. In the period of Japanese
colonialism, a Taiwanese would be punished by being forced to kneel out in the sun for
speaking Tai-yü. The situation was the same when Taiwan was recovered: my son,
4

For instance, the word for dragon is lóng. In traditional character it is 龍 while the simplified
character is 龙. They have the same meaning but different characters. Traditional Chinese
characters are also used in Hong Kong, Macau, and can also be seen in older Chinatowns
throughout America.
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Hsien-wen, and my daughter-in-law, Yüeh-yün, often wore a dunce board around their
necks in the school as punishment for speaking Tai-yü. I am very aware of the situation
because I often go to the countryside to talk to people. Their lives are influenced by
history. I think the most miserable people are Taiwanese, who have always tried in vain
to get their heads above the water. This was the Taiwanese situation during the period of
Japanese colonialism; it was not any different after Taiwan’s recovery. I have deep
feeling about this. (As quoted by Hsiau, 1997 p. 302 from Lee Tung-Hui, Central Daily
News, April 16, 1994)
It must be remembered that Mandarin became the national language of Taiwan after the KMT
established its rule there and that it was never the dominate language in Taiwan until the KMT
established an authoritarian presence. The KMT required use of Mandarin changed with
Taiwan’s liberalization and democratization.
Since the liberalization of Taiwan’s government, there has been a push for the use of
Taiwanese and the continual development of a multi-lingual state as seen by the implementation
of mother tongue classes in elementary and middle schools in Taiwan (Wu, 2009). Language,
again, is central to the sense of Taiwanese identity and freedom. The localization of the
Taiwanese identity coincides with Anderson idea that the nationalism can be controlled through
print capitalism and media. In the 1990s, the stronghold that the KMT had on Taiwan’s media
production was loosened and grassroots organizations were able to produce and distribute media
focusing on Taiwan’s multi-ethnic identity (Wilson, 2009). The liberalization of Taiwan’s
political atmosphere also meant the resurgence of the Taiwanese language after the ban on the
use of local language was lifted by former President Lee Teng-hui. Taiwanese has been an
effective tool in awakening the ethnic conscience in Taiwan. It has continued to make strides in
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garnering more media and educational resources to insure the preservation of the native language
for future generations (Dupré, 2014). Prior to the Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, Taiwanese identity
heavily suppressed, but with the liberalization of Taiwan’s government has helped in the
progression of the indigenization of Taiwan.
As mentioned, the sense of Taiwanese identity, for a long time, was under pressure from
the KMT. The implementation of martial law, better known as the White Terror in Taiwan
(1947-1987), was an era of suppression and secrecy for those who sought a Taiwanese identity
and Taiwanese independence. Implemented to prevent the spread communism and suppress
Taiwanese independence, thousands of people who wished for independence were black listed
and exiled, imprisoned, or executed by the KMT in the name of anti-communism. Those who
were exiled and the students abroad who also identified Taiwanese were the keepers of Taiwan’s
independence movement. The liberalization and democratization of Taiwan, which was rooted in
American educated Taiwanese people, took swift hold once martial law and White Terror ended
in 1987 (Lynch, 2008). The lifting of martial law plays a pivotal role in the avocation and
indigenization of Taiwanese identity because Taiwanese people no longer had to live in fear for
expressing their own sense of identity and could begin to express themselves in a way that
wasn’t fully controlled by the KMT. The lift on martial law was also advantageous for the
growth of Taiwan’s flourishing democracy, which saw its first free election in 1996 and first
party transition from the KMT to the DPP in 2000.
As Taiwan’s government and relationship with the U.S. has changed over time, so has
Taiwan’s educational materials on the meaning of Taiwanese identity. Between 1945 and 1988
was the KMTs most dominant presence in Taiwanese school systems as they promoted their own
national identity, ideas on governance, and the notion of reclaiming Mainland China (Lien, 2014).
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It was not until martial law was lifted in 1987 did Taiwanese people begin to revisit their unique
relationship with Japan and education was starting to be reformed. This begins another shift in
the identity of Taiwanese people as they are given the chance to explore the history and culture
that was hidden from them without threat from the KMT. According to the Japanese Tourism
Marketing Company, there has been a rise in Taiwanese visitors to Japan. In 1990, when the
statistics were first recorded, there were a total of 607,721 visitors from Taiwan. That figure has
grown to 3,677,075 visitors in 2015, six times the amount of Taiwanese visitors in 1990
(Japanese Tourism Marketing Company, 2016). This rise in Taiwanese tourist can be related to
the populations interest in their colonial past and the partial Japanese identity that was buried
during the KMTs rule. For the post-marital law generation, it is important to mention that this
generation is exploring materials that aren’t provided by the state and are learning lessons from
other countries (Zhang, 2009). The Japanization, Sinification, and the liberalization of Taiwan
has had a profound impact on the identity of the island. Through education, many are able to
explore the identity they have and it is through students that many political movements have
come alive, coming to the protection of democracy and independence.
The historical development of Taiwan’s independence movement, though not overly
extensive, is also linked to Japan and extensively links the U.S. to Taiwan. The proposition for
independence has been entrenched outside of Taiwan in its diasporic community. The Taiwanese
diaspora is linked to Taiwanese students during Japanese occupation. Many Taiwanese people
went to Japan for education or had gone to Japan after China regained possession of the island
due to their loyalty to Japan. The early independence movement was pioneered by a pair
Taiwanese brothers, Thomas and Joshua Liao, who were educated in the U.S. They had
established the Formosan League for Reemancipation in Hong Kong in 1947 and later took their
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ideas of independence for Taiwan to Japan. It was in 1955 when Thomas Liao was elected to
lead the now defunct Republic of Taiwan, established in Japan with the help of Taiwanese
supporters and Japanese sympathizers. Though America was interested in the independence
movement, the U.S. ultimately succumbed to KMT pressure by supporting their Cold War ally
instead of recognizing Liao as a foreign head of state (Wang, 2013). Though the provincial
government was unsuccessful, it does prove that parts of the Taiwanese nation sought
independence for their country. This brings to light the fact that there is a Taiwanese American
identity that has long been in the U.S. that vies for independence. Similar to the movements that
have taken place in Taiwan in recent times, the independence and democracy movements for
Taiwan by Taiwanese Americans has been led by students and has grown into a powerful force
in the U.S. government (Wang, 2013). The lift on martial law and liberalization of Taiwan’s
government has been beneficial for Taiwanese people who advocate and support eventual
independence, giving activist open space to advocate freely. Only since the end of the Cold War
have Taiwanese people really been able to openly protest without authoritarian ramifications and
has been an integral part of Taiwanese identity.
In relation to Taiwanese identity during and after the Cold War, Taiwanese American
identity has and continues to be synonymous with independence for Taiwan and differentiation
from their Chinese counterparts. It was Taiwanese Americans who helped push for Congress to
pass the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, prior to the establishment of the Formosan Association
for Public Affairs (FAPA). Due to Taiwan’s international political status, mentioned in the next
paragraph, the establishment of Taiwanese American identity and the hope for freedom for
Taiwan is evident in the work that the independence movement and FAPA had done in the past.
In 1982, independence activist successfully lobbied for Congress to allocate an annual quota of
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20,000 immigrants for Taiwan specifically, detached from having Taiwan’s numbers fall under
China’s quota count. FAPA has also been successful in their lobbying efforts, getting Congress
to pass the Birth Place Act in 1994, which allowed foreign born U.S. citizens to put Taiwan
down as their place of birth instead of China (Wang, 2013).
The importance of Taiwanese Americans is ever more present when political issues come
to mind. Those living in the diaspora are an integral part of the development of Taiwan’s
international status. Since Taiwan, or more accurately the ROC, was removed from the U.N. in
1971 and replaced by the PRC, the island nation has been denied formal statehood. America does
not take a firm stance on the status of Taiwan as exhibited since the KMT fled to the island. In
1949, when U.S. President Harry Truman was asked about Taiwan at a press conference he
stated, “that is not a free country. It is a part of Nationalist China, and we still recognize
Nationalist China as the government of China” (The Presidents News Conference, 1949). His
status on Taiwan was further complicated when he said, “the future status of Formosa [Taiwan]
must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or
consideration by the United Nations” following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950
(Statement by the President, 1950).
President Truman and his administration are not the only U.S. government officials to
have mixed messages about the status of Taiwan. The U.S. State Department stated, “sovereignty
over Taiwan and the Pescadores is an unsettled question” (Roberts, 1971) in 1971 prior to
Taiwan’s removal from the U.N. and in 1990, the Department of Defense said that Taiwan, along
with the contested Parcel and Spratly Islands as an “unresolved territorial issue” (United States,
1990). There has also been instance in the past two administrations that indicate that there is still
a mixed feeling about Taiwan’s status. The Bush Administration had urged Taiwan to participate
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in the World Health Organization under “Taiwan, China” while the administration also called for
the U.N. and the Secretary General to stop using the phrase “Taiwan is a part of China” (Hickey,
2013). Since the ROCs expulsion from the U.N., America continued to be an influential actor in
the development of Cross-Strait relations. It must be noted that the U.S. has stressed that it does
not support independence for Taiwan, but it has never mentioned that the U.S. would be opposed
to independence for Taiwan, more rather remaining as candid as possible about the situation
(Hickey, 2013).
Taiwan’s international status, amongst other international issues, stems from U.S.
strategic interest during the Cold War. Wang quotes Robert Scalapino in describing Taiwan and
its quest for self-determination as a “great American dilemma” and goes on further to say that:
the Taiwanese desire for self-determination was foreclosed by the global conditions of
the Cold War that favored the KMT anticommunist campaign on the right and
championed communist China as a hopeful alternative on the left. . . in which America’s
political-ethical principles have often been compromised for the sake of its interests. The
Cold War froze the Taiwanese aspiration for independence. (Wang, 2013, p. 94)
Aspirations for independence still grew in the U.S. due to the rising population of Taiwanese
students. The rise of the independence movement in the U.S. started in the 1956 and grew even
larger throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The independence movement is still alive today as
Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans still talk about the subject, evident in the development and
support of laws pertaining to Taiwan, continual cross-cultural exchange, and ongoing efforts of
pro-independence organizations in the U.S.
Since 1971, Taiwan has been looking for international legitimacy due to its removal from
the U.N. and replacement by mainland China. This has left Taiwan without any access to the
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U.N. and its affiliated organizations, such as the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The U.N. was created to prevent
conflict and promote inclusion in the world. Such goals have not been met as Taiwan is rarely
mentioned due to China’s “One China Policy,” which states that there is only one Chinese state
with two different government systems. The policy was initially recognized in 1972 as U.S.
President Richard Nixon had begun normalizing ties with the PRC (Huang & Wang, 2013). This
prevents other nation-states from forming formal diplomatic relations with both the ROC and
PRC. Though this is currently the case, the ROC is officially recognized by 22 nation-states
across the world, 12 of whom are from Latin America, six from Oceania, three from Africa and
one official Western ally, The Holy See (Ministry of the Interior of ROC).
Though Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies are scarce, the state has been able to establish
informal relationships with various countries, most importantly the U.S. The political
relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. is unique in nature due to the fact that Taiwan is not
recognized as a de jure nation-state. Taiwan was rattled by the United States’ sudden and
unexpected move to denounce their relationship with the ROC. On December 15, 1978, the U.S.
announced that it would be effectively establishing full diplomatic relationships with the PRC on
January 1, 1979. In order for that to happen, the U.S. had to sever official ties with the ROC, the
nullification of the 1954 U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty, and the U.S. had to remove all of
their troops from Taiwan. Though this is the case, the U.S. has been able to maintain relations
with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) signed by former President Jimmy Carter.
The treaty has been mutually beneficial for both the U.S. and Taiwan as the acts purpose is to:
help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the
foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial,
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cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on
Taiwan, and for other purposes. (Taiwan Relations Act, 1979, p. 1)
The TRA has led to the sale of billions worth of military equipment to Taiwan for defensive
purposes. The most recent transaction approved by the Obama administration was worth 1.83
billion-dollar in military equipment (Cohen, 2016). The U.S. has also been directly involved in
the military defense of Taiwan against China. From July 24, 1995 through March 1996, the
Cross-Strait conflict almost became volatile as Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui took a visit to
the U.S. and gave a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. This, amongst other Taiwanese
political matters, outraged the PRC since high ranking Taiwanese officials were not supposed to
be able to enter the U.S. other than for short transit stops. This notion was defied as both houses
in Congress and subsequently President Clinton approved President Lee’s visa. Soon after
President Lee’s visit, the PRC began conducting military exercises with some as close as 30
miles away from Taiwan, ran underground nuclear arms test, and launched missiles over and
around Taiwan with some being as close as 19 miles away from Taipei. In an attempt to
deescalate the situation, President Clinton deployed two air craft carriers, the Nimitz and the
Independence, to the Taiwan Strait to monitor Chinese military exercises and missile launches
(Thies & Bratton, 2004). The effects of this relationship continues to influence U.S. foreign
policy as the U.S. government continues to maintain relations between the PRC and the ROC.
Due to the informal relationship that the U.S. has with Taiwan, they are not able to firmly aid
Taiwan in formal independence, therefore it has been up to Taiwanese Americans to maintain the
relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan.
The TRA provides Taiwan with an unofficial line of communication with the U.S. and
the means to protect itself from the threat of invasion, which China has stated it would use in
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order to take Taiwan. The TRA has led the U.S. to establish the American Institute in Taiwan
(AIT), which acts as unofficial U.S. embassies and consulates to Taiwan. In similar fashion, the
Taiwanese government established the D.C. based Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative’s Office (TECRO), which serves as an unofficial embassy, and Taiwan Economic
and Cultural Offices, serving as consulates scattered throughout 12 U.S. cities (Dumbaugh,
2009). The continual cross-cultural exchange in economics and education between the two
nations is an important factor in maintaining this informal relationship. As China continues its
economic rise it becomes even more present that the U.S. must tip-toe around the fragile line that
is the Cross-Strait relationship and play to both sides of this potentially volatile geopolitical issue.
America’s original interest in Taiwan was to prevent the spread of communism in the East.
Though this is no longer the case, America still has a vested interest in Taiwan and its diasporic
community. Taiwan has been known as one of the Four Asian Tigers for its strong economy and
has been lauded by the U.S. as a fine example of democracy in East Asia. The U.S. is one of
Taiwan’s most coveted allies. Though the relationship between the two is unofficial, it is a
prominent relationship for both countries. According to the Institute of International Education
(IIE), Taiwan has consistently sent students abroad for their education with thousands of students
coming to the U.S. for a higher education every year. Statistics provided by IIE states that the
peak of Taiwan’s output was the 1993-1994 school year with 37,581 students in the U.S. Though
numbers have been dropping over the past nine years, the country has consistently placed in the
top 10 in terms of students sent to the U.S. since at least 1999. Taiwan was also the leading
contributor of foreign students to the U.S. from 1987 until 1989, when China overtook Taiwan’s
spot. The statistics also show that there is an escalating interest in Taiwan by Americans as there
were only 144 Americans studying in Taiwan in 1996, which has grown to 801 in 2014.
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According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, Taiwan has ranked among America’s top
trading partners, ranking in the top 15, for several years.
Taiwan continues to be a topic of discussion in the White House and both U.S. legislative
houses with the Senate established Senate Taiwan Caucus, and House of Representatives
establishment of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus. Recently, the importance of U.S.-Taiwanese
relations was highlighted in the media as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump took a
congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, a feat that has not occurred
since the U.S. severed official ties with the ROC. Though this phone call has angered China, Mr.
Trump stated that the call from President Tsai was to congratulate him on his presidential victory
while also talking about “close economic, political, and security ties” (Wall Street Journal,
Paletta, Lee, & Browne, 2016). In terms of the legislative houses, Taiwanese Americans are also
still involved with Taiwan’s quest for formal independence and continues to educate those who
may not know much about the Cross-Strait issue. Now headquartered in Washington D.C.,
FAPA, which was mentioned earlier for their previous work, was formed in 1982 in Los Angeles
with the goals of promoting international support for the rights of the people of Taiwan, to
establish an independent and democratic country, to join the international community, promote
relations and cooperation between Taiwan and the United States, protect the right of selfdetermination for the people of Taiwan, promote peace and security for Taiwan, and advance the
rights and interests of Taiwanese communities throughout the world (FAPA.org). The
organization also established the FAPA Young Professionals Group in 2003, which aimed to
bring together second and third generation Taiwanese Americans in an effort to promote the
same goals and provide an annual conference for this group to discuss and advocate for issues
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pertaining to Taiwan. FAPA acts as the largest pro-Taiwan lobby in Washington D.C. and is the
Taiwanese equivalent to the Israeli led American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Wang, 2013).
In most recent efforts, FAPA has made statements for the support of the Taiwan Travel
Act, introduced to the House of Representatives in September 2016. This is the second attempt
for the Taiwan Travel Act to be tested in the House, with the first attempt taking place in April
2013. The passage of such a law would grant high ranking Taiwanese officials the legal means to
visit the U.S. for diplomatic purposes, specifically stating, “To encourage visits between the
United States and Taiwan at all levels, and for other purposes” (Chabot, 2016, H.R. 6047).
Though it may not pass this year, it does show that there is progress to be made on the
relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. Future work on the issue is also on the agenda as
FAPA has recently released statements in support for the 2020 U.S. census to have a separate
column for “Taiwanese” instead of having the Taiwanese population write it in like it has had to
in the past. This has been an issue for FAPA, Taiwanese support groups, and Taiwanese
Americans for many years. In 1998, former FAPA president Chen Wen Yen took part in a
congressional hearing in front of the subcommittee for the 2000 census. A decade later the
Taiwanese American Citizens League made a video featuring prominent Taiwanese Americans
in an attempt to get Taiwanese Americans to write in Taiwanese in the 2010 Census. In the last
census, which was conducted in 2010, FAPA had advocated for Taiwanese Americans to write in
“Taiwanese” and continues to do so now for the 2020 Census. Presented by Ed Royce, the
California Republican House Representative and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
stated in a letter to John Thompson, Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, on October 27th, 2016
that:
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Many of my Taiwanese-American constituents have consistently expressed frustration
and concern to me over the lack of statistics available on Taiwanese-Americans. . . The
Census Bureau must ensure that the 2020 Census is both accurate and reflective of the
U.S. population. As Taiwanese-Americans consider themselves a separate ethnicity from
Chinese Americans, I believe that it would be prudent to honor and respect their identity.
(Royce, 2016, paragraph 3 & 4)
Taiwanese American identity and its population is one of interest as the group grows larger every
year. According to data provided by the Department of Homeland Security, between 1950 and
2014 approximately 472,222 Taiwanese people in America that have become lawful permanent
residence in the U.S. Another 65,757 Taiwanese have become naturalized in the U.S. between
2005 and 2014. The American Community Survey (ACS), which is conducted annually and does
not affect the electoral college like the 10-year survey, also collects data on Taiwanese
Americans. According to ACS data, Taiwanese alone and Taiwanese in combination with
another race or ethnicity has grown. In 2005, the ACS only reported 99,344 Taiwanese and
mixed Taiwanese. In the same survey, the number grows by almost 50 percent by 2010 with
183,528 Taiwanese and mixed Taiwanese or mixed Taiwanese being reported. According to the
2015 ACS data, most recent available, there was an estimated 187,164 Taiwanese and mixed
Taiwanese. According to the U.S. Census that took place in 2010, the estimated Taiwanese
American population has seen tremendous growth with an estimated population of 215,441
excluding those who marked both Chinese and Taiwanese, that identify as Taiwanese, a 65
percent difference from just over 130,391 identifiers in the 2000 U.S. Census (Census Data,
2010). Most Taiwanese immigrants live predominately in California with almost half of those
that identify as Taiwanese living in the state. The Southern California area has the largest
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population of Taiwanese people with 23.7 percent of the population followed by Northern
California with 15.5 percent and the combination of New York and New Jersey with 11.7
percent of the Taiwanese immigrant population (McCabe, 2012). Taiwanese Americans continue
to expand and play a crucial role in Taiwan’s pursuit for international legitimacy as the
population grows.
Though Taiwan’s relationship with the U.S. is important and continuously growing,
Taiwan is still struggling to gain participation in large international organizations. Recently,
Taiwan was denied participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
assembly, which only takes place every three years. A U.N. organization, the ICAO was
established after WWII and is meant to bring nations together to discuss aviation safety and
regulations. Taiwan had high hopes for participation after its participation in the assembly in
2013 under ex-president Ma Ying-jeou, who is pro-unification. It is an example of how relations
between the two sides of the strait are beginning to grow cold again as current independence
leaning president Tsai Ing-wen begins her administration. In an age that is dependent on
information, connectivity, and globalization, denying Taiwan’s participation in the U.N. and its
organization denies the island nation and its people the proper participation and rights to
organization that aid in the collaboration in economics, health, human rights, education, and
global safety (Hsu, 2007).
The demand for U.N. inclusion and state to state recognition is still on the agenda of
Taiwanese Americans. Though denied, Taiwan has continuously submitted applications for
participation in the U.N. and its subsidiaries since 1993 and has yielded little result, mainly due
to the fact that China has a permanent seat on the security council and has continually
perpetuated its claim that Taiwan is not a sovereign state. China also has many more formal
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diplomatic ties and the economic means to maintain them, making it difficult for Taiwan to be
heard. In Taiwan’s most recent bid for U.N. participation, which was denied, came with the
political support of Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans as they partook in the Keep Taiwan
Free march, which takes place in New York City and promotes membership in the U.N. for
Taiwan. For 2016, the rally was able to bring Freddy Lim, a member of Taiwan’s parliament and
co-founder of a New Power Party in Taiwan, to help advocate for U.N. participation. In an
interview with NBC, Lim refers to Taiwan’s democratic election and states that, "the result of the
election earlier this year means a lot to the Taiwanese community and the whole world, that
people of Taiwan want changes and especially want equal participation rights in the international
community" (Interview with Lim by Fuchs, NBC News, 2016) indicating that Taiwanese people
have spoken and are prepared to take a new direction and ready for participation in the
international community, regardless of what China believes. Even though Taiwan’s diplomatic
allies are few, they can still be heard in conferences inside the U.N. as hours in the past have
been spent talking about the admission of Taiwan (Hsu, 2007). Equality in the international
community will continue to be an issue for Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans. Taiwanese
Americans who wish to see their nations status flourish firmly take charge in the rise in
Taiwanese nationalism abroad (Wang, 2013).
Taiwan’s lack of international status and participation also plays out in other international
arenas, most notably in the Olympics. The name of Taiwan’s Olympic committee has changed
from The Chinese Olympic Committee to The Taiwan Olympic Committee, to The Republic of
China Olympic Committee and finally to The Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (Huang &
Wang, 2013). Since 1981, “Chinese Taipei,” along with a different flag and anthem, has been the
name and banner that Taiwanese athletes have had to continue to compete under. The name is
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also used in international organizations such as the Asian Games Foundation, Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation, and the World Health Organization when Taiwan was granted observer
status. Since the lifting of martial law and the liberalization of Taiwan’s political system, the use
of the name has been an issues for many Taiwanese people as thoughts of independence still
loom and the emergence of Taiwanese identity persist. The heightened focus on Taiwanese
identity has also been evident in American sports and entertainment.
Becoming even more localized in sports and entertainment, Taiwanese Americans are
relevant in multiple arenas of American life. The most prominent Taiwanese American to
recently come under the international spotlight is Jeremy Lin. The Harvard educated NBA player
is of Taiwanese decent with his parents immigrating from Taiwan to the U.S. in the 1970s. The
international phenomenon known as ‘Linsanity’ began in February of the 2012 NBA season and
ended at the end of the same season when Lin announced that he would need knee surgery before
the NBA playoffs took place. This particular season was also a lockout year making the season
short than usual, but was a long enough window for Lin to showcase his talents. The unknown,
undrafted free agent, became the unlikely hero for the New York Knicks when he was brought
off the bench to rattle off a series of wins to save the Knicks ailing season. During his rise to
NBA stardom, there was a media firestorm covering him from the U.S., Taiwan, China and
various other areas of the world. For the first time, an Asian American and more importantly, a
Taiwanese American, was the central focus of the U.S., Taiwan and the sports world. Praised by
Taiwanese and Asian Americans in general (Combs & Wasserstrom, 2013), he has served as an
interesting flashpoint for Asian American identity and even more so for Taiwanese American
identity.
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Taiwan often seeks positive news coverage since the country does not often get the global
attention that it wants. Lin has been lauded by Taiwanese news media for bringing positive
global visibility to Taiwan (Su, 2014). Taiwan has produced other stellar athletes and
entertainers but what makes Lin different is the fact that he is an American born Taiwanese
athlete and his journey to stardom was unlike any other Taiwanese athletes had ever had. Lin sets
himself apart from other “Glory of Taiwan” since he is the first Taiwanese American NBA
player in history. 5 Even though he is American, his Taiwanese heritage was a focal point in his
story, evident in the coverage of Lin in the U.S. and in Taiwan. Taiwan has had a lack of selfassurance in nationalism in the past due to various regime and national identity changes, making
the country anxious to adopt foreign identities (Chiang & Chen, 2015). Throughout several
confidant games, Taiwan adopted their diasporic NBA player and the Taiwanese American
identity as Taiwanese media found various ways to connect Lin to Taiwan. The media got him to
speak in Mandarin, talk about Taiwan, and ultimately got him and his family to share his
experiences as a Taiwanese American (Chiang & Chen, 2015).
Even though he was born in the U.S., he is portrayed as an iconic sports hero in Taiwan,
but as a foreigner in the domain of the sports world and America. News media and coverage was
unequal in displaying his identity as American media propped his story with an underdog
narrative with an immigration background further focusing on his ethnicity and race that would
make him seem less American and thus an outsider, while Taiwanese media propped his story as
an underdog that displayed national heroics but neglecting his Americanness (Su, 2014). It is an

5

“Glory of Taiwan” is a saying that refers to Taiwanese people who have gained notable
international status, performing well on a global stage, and are especially prominent in the U.S.
Some of the most notable “Glory of Taiwan” include Oscar winning director Ang Lee, MLB
pitcher Wang Chien-ming, and professional tennis player Lu Yen-hsun, better known as Rendy
Lu.
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interesting case of how Taiwanese American identity is praised, neglected, and confused in U.S.
media coverage. He was praised for his underdog story, humble upbringing, work ethic, and
skills; neglected as he is portrayed as a foreigner through the media’s coverage of his ethnicity
and family immigration history; and confusing because, “his identity was constantly confused in
media coverage that mentioned the contest between Taiwan and China to claim Lin as their own”
(Su, 2014, p. 482). Like many Taiwanese American stories, his story in America focused on his
race, ethnicity, and how he didn’t fit the norm even though he was born and raised in the U.S. It
is a continual tale of how Taiwanese Americans are still an unrepresented, underreported
community that serves as an interesting story for media headlines, but are ultimately still seen as
outsiders in their own country. To Taiwan, Linsanity was an indication of progression and a
desire for the end of diplomatic isolation, marginalization, and opposition under the One China
policy (Su, 2014). In a global context, the story of Jeremy Lin is only a glimpse of Taiwanese
American identity, especially in an arena that is dominated by whites and blacks. In the U.S., his
legitimacy and worth in the NBA has also been linked to his race and the monetary value that an
Asian American can bring to a capitalistic operation such as the NBA and challenges the racial
binary placed on supposedly colorblind arenas of America (Chang, 2014).
Though he serves as a great Taiwanese American story, his identity was and still is a
subject to critique. It has served as a reminder of the racial stereotypes and barriers placed on
Pan-Asian American identity and how Taiwanese people are overlooked, confused, or grouped
with Chinese people in the context of America’s multi-ethnic narrative (Magat, 2015). Asian
Americans are also becoming the focus of television as Taiwanese American chef, writer, and
former attorney, Eddie Huang’s memoir turned television show has become a hit. The book and
show, called Fresh Off the Boat, focuses on the story of a Taiwanese immigrant couple, their
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American born kids, and the parents struggles as they chase success, maintain their Taiwanese
identity, and a kids encounter with assimilation in a predominantly white neighborhood. 6
Lin and Huang serves as a reminder that Taiwanese Americans are just as American as
any other race in the U.S. and share the same struggles that many other immigrant communities
face. It also brings to attention how their identity has been under a microscope and how for that
moment in time, Taiwanese identity in America has been hyper-focused. Though neither figure
formally talks about independence and democracy and avoids expressing opinions about CrossStrait issues, they do serve as an ambassador for Taiwanese American identity and its place in
American society. The emergence of Taiwanese Americans and prominent, famous, Taiwanese
Americans such as Lin and Huang calls for a heightened need to explore Taiwanese identity, the
experience that Taiwanese Americans have, and the complex social, cultural and political
identity issues that many Taiwanese people must continue to face as China vies for Taiwanese
acceptance.
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Methodology
Literature review
Sinocentric development and past Japanization. Taiwan’s national identity is
conglomeration of different ideologies and cultures that has formed out of early colonization,
Japanese imperialization, KMT Sinification, and America’s Cold War. Sinification and the
development of a Sinocentric identity involve the intense embrace of Chinese norms, culture,
and language, which came at the expense of Taiwanese literature, arts, and language (Lynch,
2008). The KMT was committed to Sinocentrism and turning Taiwanese people into Chinese
nationals. During the KMTs authoritarian rule, the lives of Taiwanese people were centered
6

“Fresh off the boat” is often a derogative term that is used in reference to immigrants who have
not necessarily assimilated in the new country they call home.
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around Chinese history, literature, and geography with the intention of sowing feelings of
Chinese morality, conscience, and patriotism (Lien, 2014). The KMT further suppressed feelings
of Taiwanese independence and identity via the White Terror, and by enforcing a monolingual
policy that made Mandarin the prime language of the ROC, excluding the use of Taiwanese from
public use. A study done by Chen, Huang, and Liao (2013) indicates that the notion of
Taiwanese independence and Taiwanese identity has changed over the course of several decades
from one of Sinocentric focus to one that is more rooted in Taiwan’s multi-colonial past, ethnic
diversity, and shifting polity, thus moving away from a China focused history and identity.
Various historical events and the liberalization of Taiwan’s government has led to varying ideas
about Taiwan’s identity. Though there is no denying that many of the ancestors of Taiwanese
people are from China, Taiwanese national identity is moving into a direction where they
identify less as Chinese and more as Taiwanese (Zhong, 2016). Taiwan has gone through identity
shifts in the past that did not focus on China as it was incorporated into different empires.
Prior to the KMTs establishment in Taiwan, the island was controlled by Japan which led
to the Japanization and modernization of Taiwan. Chronicled by Leo T.S. Ching (2001), the
people of Taiwan were forced to adopt Japanese culture, getting to the point where some in
Taiwan began adopting Japanese names, studying in Japan, and speaking Japanese. During
Japanese occupation, the people in Taiwan were forced to go through a time of Japanization
(Ching, 2001). Japanization was the enforcement of Japanese language, culture, and loyalty on
Japanese subjects and overall altered the identity of the subjugated people. Taiwan’s identity
shifts during the 50 years of colonial occupation as the islands inhabitants become Japanese
subjects through Japan’s implementation of dōka (assimilation) and kōminka (imperialization)
policies (Ching, 2001). During this time, the colonized in Taiwan were forced to adopt Japanese
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customs, forced to learn the Japanese language, and some of the colonized even went as far as
adopting Japanese names.
The idea of kōminka was instilled in Japanese colonies as World War II was about to
begin. Some Taiwanese had joined the Japanese Imperial Army, which also fought against the
Chinese. This serves as an interesting point in the formation of Taiwanese identity as Japan
pressured the population in Taiwan to become “good Japanese” and sought their loyalty to
Imperial Japan. With Japanization came the temporary removal of Taiwan’s Sinocentric identity.
As Ching points out when he quotes Ozaki Hotsuki:
Under the banner of kōminka, the use of Chinese script and the staging of Chinese plays
were prohibited. The Taiwanese-Chinese temples and ancestral shrines were abolished,
and their religious beliefs suppressed. Speakers of Taiwanese in normal schools were
disciplined; even tutorials for classical Chinese were forced to shut down by the
police. . . . As far as literature was concerned, after the twelfth year of Shōwa [1937], it
has become absolutely impossible to publish in the Chinese language. If one is to publish
at all, it must be in Japanese. (Ching, 2001, p. 93-94)
This agenda was pushed as Japan got closer to war and transformed the colonized
subjects sense of identity from a sense of living as a Japanese subject to dying a loyal Japanese
subject. Though Taiwanese people were Japanese subjects, they were often treated as second
class citizens. Though treated as second class citizens both socially and politically, Taiwan did
make strides as a colony of Japan, undoubtedly harboring some remnants of Japanese identity.
Though the colonization was unlike the European form, it still left a void in the sense of identity
for Taiwanese people. Taiwanese people had felt abandoned, left without any help from the
Chinese in the beginning of Japan’s colonization and how they were left without any help from
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the Japanese when the KMT forces came to the island, further compounded later when the U.S.
decided to pursue formal relations with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan left Taiwanese people
feeling abandoned to construct their own identity (Ching, 2001). Interestingly, Japanese culture
can still be found in Taiwan even though the KMT implemented an intense de-Japanization
during its rule. Those who received their education during KMT rule usually had anti-Japanese
sentiment due to the KMTs push for Chinese nationalism (Zhang, 2009). Again, this raises a
question about the shared history that makes a nation.
KMT control forced Taiwanese people to give up their own history and had it replaced
with what the KMT wanted, a Sinocentric education (Lu, 2002). The removal of Taiwan’s
colonial history is crucial to a countries own identity and story. Other countries that have been
colonies often teach about their past and address post-colonial issues. For example, the U.S.
often talks about the 13 colonies, Aimé Césaire talks about post-colonial issues in his book
Discourse on Colonialism, and Franz Fanon does as well in Black Skin, White Mask. It becomes
a reference rooted in nationalism as it is a nations shared history, identity, and interest. Until the
KMT relinquished authoritarian power, the island was led by political refugees with the desires
of native Taiwanese people essentially being disregarded in their own political atmosphere,
replacing Taiwan’s history with the history and identity that the KMT desired (Model, 2015). As
the KMT eradicated the islands recollection of Japanese colonization, it was those abroad that
were able to keep the memory and history alive. Taiwanese people are now exploring these roots
that have been long buried and forgotten by the hands of the KMT.
Local identity and indigenization. Taiwan as a nation has evolved since its
appropriation by the KMT. Benedict Anderson describes a nation of people as an imagined
community. Describing it as a large group of people who share a common history, language, and
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culture, while also living in a defined territorial area (Anderson, 1983). In establishing a
Taiwanese identity, the Taiwanese nation has the traits Anderson prescribes as Taiwan is
ethnolinguistically unique, has a history that varies from China’s, confined to a defined territorial
space, and a culture that has embodies modernity along with various colonial identities. It must
be remembered that it was the KMT that forced a Chinese identity on Taiwan while also causing
the nation to harbor anti-Japanese sentiment (Fleischauer, 2007). The KMT came to Taiwan in
1949, after they had lost the Chinese Civil War to Mao Zedong’s communist forces. During this
time there was a push for Taiwanese independence. Though the KMT was responsible for deJapanization policy’s, it is often forgotten in history that they were also responsible for the loss
of 10,000 to 25,000 Taiwanese lives as a result of the 228 Incident (Fleischauer, 2007). The 228
incident took place in February 1947, when Taiwan was being reintroduced to Chinese control
after World War II and was not incorporated as a province of China, instead being controlled
directly by the KMT government. Many Taiwanese people were fed up with the governance of
the KMT as it had lowered the standard of living that they had grown accustomed to during
Japanese rule. The incident began when the State Monopoly Bureau injured several civilians
while arresting a street peddler selling contraband cigarettes in Taipei. Violence and resistance
began as local Taiwanese were feeling suppressed by the KMT government, who at the time
were still in control of China and combatting communist. The violence led to the government’s
crackdown on the resistance, forcing the independence movement to take firmer roots abroad and
the beginning of Taiwan’s White Terror and soon after the implementation of martial law. Per
the example of the 228 incident, Fleischauer also reminds us that Taiwanese felt suppressed by
the Chinese and had sought out independence, or at least more autonomy, prior to the KMTs firm
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establishment on the island and that the incident further served as a rallying point for
benshengren.
Due to historical events, time periods, and conflicts, such as; White Terror (1947-1987),
Chiang Kai-shek’s family’s rule on the island, the removal of Taiwan’s social and political elite
through exile or execution, and the monopoly on power that the KMT elite established did
inhabitants on the island not pursue an independence agenda.7 Instead, independence movements
were left to the Taiwanese people living abroad. It should also be noted that there has been a
shift in Taiwanese identity from a Japanese identity to a Sinocentric identity to a more localized
Taiwanese identity that focused and celebrated on Taiwan’s Hokkien roots (Wilson, 2009). The
indigenization of Taiwan has taken place over several decades and is due in part to the education
system in Taiwan and it continual role in Taiwanese identity development. As Taiwan continues
its nation-state building project, it becomes more evident that there is an urge to distinguishes
itself though expressions of history and culture, most notably seen in the early 2000s when the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) pushed for cultural festivals and identifiers (Schak, 2009).
Taiwanese people are also transnational in the way they view their status in the world and have
developed various ways to distinguish itself from China. John Copper (2003, p. 92) points out
that “the large proportion of Taiwan’s citizens visiting other countries makes the population
quite worldly and affects the population’s view of Taiwan’s place in the world, including
whether Taiwan is part of China or is a separate country” while also laying out the political,
economic, and societal differences that make Taiwan unique.
There is no denying the fact that Taiwan is culturally similar to China and that a majority
of the ancestors of Taiwanese people are from China as well, but there is also no denying the fact
7

Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, succeeded him after his death in 1975. Chiang
Ching-kuo ruled until his death in 1988 and was succeeded by Lee Tung-hui.
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that the two states have deviated from each other in their cultural practices. As explained by
Robert Weller, Taiwan and China, though similar cultural practices, have developed different
spaces and norms in the development of their civil society and customary practices. He points
out that there is a difference in the way sociopolitical, environmental, and economic movements
between the two states vary, that the liberalization of Taiwan has its history in movements and
protest, but also use cultural tools to enhance the Taiwanese agenda (Weller, 1999). Though
similar in many ways culturally, Taiwan has repeatedly varied from Chinese history. It should be
pointed out that Taiwan was never part of or effected by contemporary historical events in the
development of modern China, such as the Boxer Rebellion, warlordism, the May Fourth
Movement, and “has never been tightly integrated into any mainland-based political system”
(Lynch, 2002, p. 568). Taiwan on the other hand, has had its own historical movements that were
unrelated to the development of mainland China. Movements are still happening in Taiwan now,
but are often focused on pursuing Taiwan’s own agenda, not revolution. An analysis conducted
by Malte Kaeding, a lecture at the University of Surrey and member of the Hong Kong
Transition Project states that,
the movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong reveals that they are essentially about the
reaffirmation of a distinct local identity. This identity is articulated by the younger
generation and embraced by large majorities of both societies. It stands in direct
opposition to the Chinese identity that the PRC government has promoted and employed
in an attempt to bind Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan to mainland China. (Kaeding, 2015,
p. 210)
Protest have been used as markers of distinct local identity in places such as Taiwan and Hong
Kong, both places that have long been separated from China but are facing challenges from
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China’s government.
Recently, Taiwanese people, particularly students, have taken activism into their own
hands in seeking civic engagement. Past political protest and movements, such as The Wild Lily
Movement of 1990, the Wild Strawberries Movement of 2008, and the Anti-Media Monopoly
Campaign of 2012 were all unique to Taiwan, all shared pro-democracy and anti-Chinese
sentiment, where all mainly led by students, and all helped form the recent Sunflower Movement,
especially since several members of the past movements were involved in the Sunflower
Movement.8 The Wild Lily Movement was led by students and was ultimately successful in
pushing President Lee to hasten the reform of democratic institutions (Rowen, 2015). The Wild
Strawberry Movement, which aimed to build off of the Wild Lily Movement, while also defying
the sweet and beautiful, but weak and easily bruised “strawberry” stereotype placed upon the
younger generations in Taiwan, took place in November 2008 when the KMT welcomed a PRC
envoy to the island.
This struck a chord with students and activist since the KMT decided to remove any
semblance of Taiwanese identity and artifacts that related to the ROC from the envoys sight.
Protesters believed that their freedom of speech and expression were being squandered in order
to appease a neighbor that was fixated on seizing their home, by force if necessary. Occupying
Liberty Square in Taiwan, protesters demanded an apology by the president and police and
called for the Assembly and Parades Act to be nullified (Rowen, 2015).9 This happened to be the
first movement to involve and be led by the generation of Taiwanese protesters who did not
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Politics graduate student Lin Fei-fan, sociology graduate student, Chen Wei-ting, and
Academia Sinica scholar, Huang Kuo-chang, became connected during the Anti-Media
Monopoly Campaign and would later become the spokespeople of the Sunflower Movement.
9
The Assembly and Parades Act was enacted by the KMT in 1988. It is used to suppress popular
protest via police force (Ministry of the Interior, ROC).
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experience the authoritarian rule that their Wild Lily Movement predecessors experienced in the
past. Though the protest was ultimately unsuccessful, it did test means of communication and
strategies and most importantly created a network of young activist who would become leaders
in other movements (Kaeding, 2015). The Anti-Media Monopoly Campaign was in protest of the
food and media giant, Want Want China Times, from acquiring controlling shares of Apple
Daily and Next Media Group, two of Taiwan’s major media outlets that often criticized China.
Want Want China has a vested interest in China and has extensive ties in the Mainland, it also
has a pro-China editorial stance, which would have been problematic for pro-independence news
outlets. The campaign was successful in blocking the trade through the connection of civilminded academics, a wide base of support, and a successful social media campaign (Rowen,
2015).
One of the most recent movements that took place in Taiwan that aimed to inhibit further
economic dependence and collaboration with China was the Sunflower Movement.10 The
Sunflower Movement, which got its name after a florist handed out sunflowers to the frontlines
of the protest, took place in March and April of 2014 during pro-unification leaning President
Ma Ying-jeou’s last term in office. This movement lasted 24 days, the longest pro-democracy
rally to take place in Taiwan’s history and the first where protesters actually occupied a major
government building. The protest started over the KMTs attempt to pass the Cross-Strait Service
Trade Agreement (CSSTA) to the then KMT dominant parliament, without the overview of the
DPP, a violation of an agreement made between the two parties in 2013 (Rowen, 2015). The
immediate passage of the law would have led to the opening of numerous economic sectors for
China’s investment in Taiwan and vice versa. The ultimate goal of this piece of legislature,
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This movement has also been referred to as 318 since it started on March 18th.
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touted by President Ma, was for more economic integration with China. Wary of economic
integration, the protest was organized and coordinated by NGOs, small and medium business
owners, and students that believed the CSSTA would be harmful to Taiwan’s economy and
independence (Rowen, 2015). In true democratic form it is said “that they [the Taiwanese
protesters] were not against trade or globalization per se, but were opposed to opaque agreements
advanced by an administration without a popular mandate” (Rowen, 2015, p. 9). Political protest
has now become a cornerstone of Taiwan’s identity in resistance to economic assimilation with
China. These recent political protest are indicative of the distinct identity of Taiwanese people,
especially the younger generations (Kaeding, 2015). Prior to these large political protest,
activism for Taiwanese rights and self-determination was often left to Taiwanese Americans and
Taiwanese students abroad. Past Taiwanese American activism resisted Chinese integration and
now is linked to current Taiwanese activism because American educated Taiwanese people were
a driving force for the liberalization of Taiwan and without Taiwanese American activism, the
island might not have received the support that it needed to move democratically forward (Lynch,
2002).
Ethnolinguistic adaptation. There is also a linguistic difference that makes Taiwan
different from its cross-strait counterpart. Language use is a main component of ethnic and
national identity in Taiwan, especially after the KMT loosened its grip on power in the 1980s
and 1990s. This led to the resurgence in the Taiwanese language, as it was replaced by Mandarin
as the lingua franca when the KMT came into control. J.F. Dupré refers to the Taiwanese
languages and specifically states that “ancestral languages (Taiwanese/Hakka/Aboriginal
Languages) appear to be an important aspect of ethnic identities. They do not, however,
constitute a particularly important component of national identity for the average citizen” (Dupré,
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2013, p. 440). Though Dupré makes this statement, Hsiau (1997) argues that the use of
Taiwanese languages, specifically Tai-yü (the language spoken by Taiwanese of Hokkien
ancestry), challenged the ethnolinguistic legitimacy of the KMT and the dominance placed in
Mandarin. It should be reminded that Taiwan’s population consist of four ethnic groups, all of
who have different linguistic practices. Known as the “four great ethnic groups” in Taiwan, the
Aboriginal, Hakka, Hokkien, and Mainlanders are all central in dealing with ethnic and national
issues and identity development in Taiwanese society (Makeham, 2005). In terms of
ethnolinguistic history, the KMT began its Mandarin language policy in Taiwan in 1946 (Hsiau,
1997). The use of Japanese was also forbidden, thus forcing generations of people to partially
hide their sense of Japanese identity. This had also posed a problem for a large majority of the
people in Taiwan since 70 percent of the population knew Japanese, rendering a large majority
illiterate under the KMTs language policy (Hsiau, 1997). Japanese was replaced by Mandarin in
schools and Japanese publications where banned, similar to how the Japanese required
publications to be in Japanese during their occupation.
Along with Japanese, the local languages found in Taiwan were once again banned from
use. The Hakka language, known as Kejia hua, was banned from use and was often practiced
within the home. The KMT had also limited the use of Taiwanese, also known as Tai-yü, the
language used by those of Hokkien background and also learned by many Kejia hua speakers.
Though Kejia hua and Tai-yü have their origins in Ancient China, the KMT only recognized
Mandarin as the legitimate language for the ROC and officially deemed Kejia hua and Tai-yü as
dialects even though the three languages are not mutually intelligible.11 Supporters of the
Taiwanese language movement rejected this notion and its designation as a dialect is another
11

For instance, to say hello in these three languages is very different sounding. In Mandarin it is
Nǐ hǎo, in Taiwanese it is lí-hó, and in Kejia hua it is ngi ho.
44

topic of debate in intellectual circles. The KMT was successful in establishing Mandarin as the
official language of the ROC in Taiwan through various methods of language policy
implementation. By 1956, children were not allowed to use “dialects” in school; by 1965, civil
servants were only permitted to use Mandarin at the office; and required that all court cases and
issues pertaining to the law were to be in Mandarin (Hsiau, 1997).
Amazingly, the Taiwanese languages have survived nearly a century worth of exclusion
from Taiwan’s public sphere. The Taiwanese language, has seen a resurgence as it has been an
essential part of the Tai-yü language movement, Taiwanese independence movement, and ethnic
identity as explained by Liu in her explanation on language group identification in Taiwan (Liu,
2012). Language became an intricate part of the local populations resistance to KMT Sinification,
that though Taiwanese people were molded to become Chinese, the local population still held
onto their mother tongue and historically used it to define themselves, the benshengren, from the
waishengren and China itself (Hsiau, 1997). The KMT knew the importance of Taiwanese,
especially during elections. It was not uncommon for candidates, both benshengren and
waishengren, to speak in Taiwanese to appeal to voters. The political capital of the Taiwanese
language holds a strong position in elections on all levels as it has become the ‘language of
elections’ (Hsiau, 1997). Though this is the case, there are still several language policies that are
confrontational to the various ethnic groups in Taiwan. The establishment of language regimes
often benefits one group at the expense of another. Whereas a majority of people in Taiwan
speak Mandarin and a large portion can also speak Taiwanese, the Hakka and Aboriginal
Taiwanese want more time and resources dedicated to their languages, especially since the
number of proficient speakers are declining and their languages are not often learned by crossethnic groups (Chen, 2010).
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The use of language is an important factor in the development and indigenization of
Taiwanese people, especially the use of Taiwanese. Language is central to the formation of
identity throughout various regimes. Wu (2009) lays out the history of languages in Taiwan and
the foundation of language policies and planning that have been implemented to serve the
historical elite in Taiwan. Wu’s explanation of language policies reveals the importance of
language in forming identity in Taiwan as the Japanese and KMT used language as a central part
of their Japanization and Sinification projects. Wu also goes on to point out that there have been
efforts in the recent past to meet the demands for minority language rights, most notably the
Hakka peoples demand for more media coverage and educational assistance through the “Return
our mother tongue” campaign, and the DPPs attempt to nationalize Taiwanese, Hakka, and the
Aboriginal languages. Though there is a resurgence in the Taiwanese language it is not without
societal and politically constructed challenges. There is still a hierarchy that is imbedded in
Taiwanese society as Mandarin is now associated with being modern, urban, and high class
whereas Taiwanese is associated with the uneducated, rural, and low-class (Su, 2008).
Taiwanese Americans and global participation. Language is not the only Taiwanese
identifier as Taiwanese identity has also taken root and grown in its diasporic community,
especially in conjunction with those desiring formal independence. Taiwan’s independence
movement has long been associated with the U.S. Though it was started in Japan and Hong Kong,
it has its firmest roots in America. George Kerr (1965) brings forth an interesting perspective on
the relationship between Taiwan’s independence movement, the KMT, and the U.S. Kerr points
out that the U.S. was interested in placing Taiwan (at the time still called Formosa) under U.N.
trusteeship. That plan was scraped when the KMT forces and anti-communist ally Chiang Kaishek voiced concern over the war effort, reaffirmed their opinion and concern for China’s “lost
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province”, and essentially made Western powers insure that Taiwan would be the KMTs as a one
of their spoils of war through the signing of the Cairo Declaration on November 27, 1943 (Kerr,
1965). These actions solidified the KMTs control of Taiwan for half a century and had
jeopardized the sovereign status of Taiwan, the self-determination of Taiwanese people, and the
identity that Taiwanese people carry; all of which are still in contention today. Taiwan’s
relationship to Taiwanese Americans is important to explore as it has been said that “Taiwan’s
national independence is curiously articulated with the Taiwanese American identity” as
mentioned by Wang Chih-ming (2013, p. 91). Taiwanese American history, though important, is
not mentioned as often as needed in defining identity. As Wang has mentioned, Taiwanese
independence was started by Taiwanese students studying abroad in Japan and the U.S. The
activism of these students led to the Taiwanese independence movement (referred to as Taidu).
Taiwanese Americans are now an essential part to Taiwan’s relationship with the U.S. Wang also
addresses the struggle in geopolitics, the Cold War, and national identity, while also focusing on
the relationship between migration and its link to modernity in Asia, and Asian Americans link
to transpacific modernity.
Based on America’s anti-communist policies and the ROCs opposition to communism,
KMT members in the U.S. during Chiang Kai-shek’s flee to Taiwan became the first “Cold War
Refugees”, complicating the discourse on Chinese and Taiwanese immigration to the U.S. The
Chinese and Taiwanese that came through the KMT are oftentimes forgotten in literature
pertaining to Asian American history. This event meant that those “refugees” to be absorbed into
America’s background and altering the course of America’s immigration policies (Hsu, 2012).
Many KMT affiliates came to the U.S. to receive their education and were to become the
technocrats to help with the modernization of China (Hsu, 2012). When the KMT lost the civil
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war to the CCP, the U.S. was prepared to back their anti-communist ally as the KMT established
their government in Taiwan. The loss also proved to be problematic for the U.S. as thousands of
highly educated KMT affiliates were left stranded in the U.S. This issue paved the way for new
U.S. immigration laws and a unique relationship with Taiwan. Those who came from Taiwan at
this time enjoyed the fact that they did not have to abide by the quota system that was in place as
their stay was based on political, legal, and ideological circumstances. This unique circumstance
also led to the approval of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act, requiring half the quotas provided to
a nation go to those who had a skill the U.S. needed and the 1952 McCarren-Walter Act, which
recognized Asian rights to migration, providing more quotas to Asians, non-quota immigration
for close relatives, and removed the racial barrier for citizenship. Throughout the 1950s and
1960s, the U.S. had passed various laws for these nationalist refugees to use to gain entrance
without counting against the quota count. The U.S. government would go on to pass PL 85-316
in 1957, which emphasized the selection of refugees based on “(1) the degree of professional,
technical, or other skill, (2) hardships or persecution, (3) sponsorship in the United States, (4)
ability to speak English, and (5) unification of close relatives” (Hsu, 2012, p. 19) similar to the
criteria used for the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, which had expired in 1956. In 1962, Congress
made it easier for the highly educated nationalist to obtain legal entrance and status when laws
prioritized immigrants with economically desirable skills. The Immigration Act of 1965 was
passed with features focusing on family reunification, which led to an increase in Asian
Americans. The number of educated, middle class Chinese and Taiwanese was masked by the
implementation of this law (Hsu, 2012). Congress allocated millions of dollars to the KMT
affiliates to complete their degrees, many of them receiving their doctorates. With no real home
to go to, many of these highly educated were able to transition into white-collar jobs, move into
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suburban America, and were provided citizenship. For decades, the ROC enjoyed sending
thousands of students to the U.S., many of whom stayed and integrated with the “uptown”
Chinese, those who were who had received their education, white-collar jobs, and suburban life
(Hsu, 2012). The Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals (ARCI) was also established to help prevent
educated Chinese from helping communist by bringing them to the U.S. Though many educated
and highly skilled Chinese workers came to the U.S. through these channels, they were not all
able to get the white collar jobs that they desired. This established a story associated with early
KMT refugees, their prominence in Asian American history, and a difference from the
commonly known Gold Mountain and CEA Chinese narrative. It provides a historical
relationship that links Taiwan and America together that is significantly different from the stories
of the Chinese who came prior to the CEA and during the quota system as they were often poorer,
denied citizenship, and where not easily accepted in American society. The current emigrational
relationship between Taiwan and American for Taiwanese Americans different.
A study points out that many born in Taiwan that currently live in America have eventual
plans to move back to Taiwan, but many end up staying in the U.S. for various reasons (Model,
2015). These Taiwan-born living in the U.S. are also a part of Taiwanese migration and identity
as they serve as a link to Taiwan for Taiwanese Americans. There is also an anxiety and struggle
that comes with defining what an authentic Asian American identity is, and more precisely in
this case, Taiwanese American identity, as Asian Americans encounter transnationalism,
globalization, and the potential loss of characteristic distinctions (Cheng, 2004). Character
distinction is also of concern when it comes to defining Taiwan and its Olympic team. Taiwan
has had to change the name of its Olympic committee numerous times due to the KMTs Olympic
involvement before and after 1949, the International Olympic Committees conflicted stance on
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the ROC and PRC, and the support and abandonment of the ROC by the U.S. during the Cold
War. The name ‘Chinese Taipei’ is the product of compromise stemming from Cold War politics
and the ROCs placating attempt to maintain some semblance of international recognition, the
IOCs push to gain the participation of the PRC, and to make Taiwan seem subordinate to the
PRC by forcing Taiwan to adhere to the “One China Policy” in an indirect manner (Huang &
Wang, 2013). Though this was accepted by Taiwanese people at the time, it is not as supported
now as it does not reflect their thoughts on Taiwanese identity. The use of “Chinese Taipei” was
initially correct and unchallenged by Taiwanese people during its inception due to the fact that
there were two central authoritarian Chinese systems, the CCP and the KMT, but those who
support Taiwanese independence are displeased with the continual use of the name.
Independence supports are vital in stopping Chinese appropriation in Olympic cooperation with
China and call for a change in the use of Chinese Taipei as many Taiwanese people identify with
their Olympic team but not the imposed Chinese name, which is not reflective of Taiwanese
identity (Xu, 2006). For many of those who support Taiwanese independence and identity, the
continual use of this name has caused disagreement as Taiwanese people have had mixed
feelings about participation under China. Many Taiwanese people have voiced their opinion on
the use of Chinese Taipei with Freddie Lim calling the name “disrespectful,” the executive
director of FAPA, Coen Blaauw, called it “humiliating,” and the resentment towards the name is
increasing (Griffiths, 2016). Taiwanese identity in sports and entertainment transcends it
participation in the Olympics. Taiwanese American identity has recently gained notable attention
with the rise of various prominent Taiwanese Americans, specifically in the entertainment
industry with the emergence of NBA star Jeremy Lin and ABC sitcom collaborator Eddie Huang.
Taiwanese Americans have recently been a focus of study in entertainment, especially with the
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media’s coverage of Jeremy Lin in both Taiwan and America. As the first Taiwanese American
NBA player, Lin’s identity as a Taiwanese male is explored by both Taiwanese and American
news media, where he serves as both a hero and outsider in both societies (Su, 2014). As
Taiwanese Americans gain more spotlight it will becomes more evident that Taiwanese
Americans are important to Taiwan’s quest for international recognition and nation-statehood as
the country continues to seek positive global coverage as seen in the case of Jeremy Lin.
Methodology, Research Design, and Data Collection
Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans are a unique group of people to inquire about due
to their distinct status in the world. In Taiwan, it is often young Taiwanese professionals and
students that are involved in pro-Taiwanese movements and language has continued to be a
factor in indigenization. Young Taiwanese people are unique because of their upbringing without
martial law, which now allows Taiwanese people to freely express their ideas about Taiwanese
identity. For Taiwanese Americans, it was important to address questions about Taiwanese
identity, specifically pertaining to languages, travels, Taiwan’s international status, and family
background, which are all addressed in this participating group. The data collected is in the form
of short interviews with young professionals and university students. The young professionals
are all of Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans decent and born in or after 1987. This age group
and enrollment status is interesting and important because these are the first generation of
Taiwanese people born outside of the martial law era, which ended in 1987. The individuals who
partook in this project were found through a snow ball effect, the first participant being a family
friend who then mentioned other Taiwanese Americans that they knew and that I knew too who
they suggested I contact. My advisor also helped me in finding participants who she knew were
Taiwanese American. These interview range from 6 minutes to 50 minutes from 9 individuals.
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Six of the participants are male and the remaining three participants are female. All of the
participants live in the United States and are of Taiwanese decent, identifying as Asian American
and more specifically Taiwanese American, though there are participants that identify as
Taiwanese American along with something else. Some of the participants were born in the U.S.
and others were born in Taiwan but moved to the U.S. prior to turning 18 years old. Participants
are also all between the ages of 18 years old and 24 years old, fitting into the desired age group.
Interviews took place between July 9th, 2016 through October 27th, 2016, seven to ten months
after Taiwan’s most recent Presidential election and around or after the most recent summer
Olympics, both events that have been referred to by a couple of those who were interviewed.
All of the interviews were conducted in English at a place and time of the interviewees
choosing and all of the interviews were self-transcribed; some interviews were conducted over
Skype or phone call due to time and distance restraints. The interview data will be used to find
trends in Taiwanese Americans and focusing on their thoughts pertaining to language, Taiwan’s
political status, transnationalism, and identity. Specifically, interview questions addressed family
migration history, including their family’s movement from China to Taiwan and from Taiwan to
the U.S. They were also asked if they had been to Taiwan and about other travel experiences
they may have had. Other questions in the interviews addressed political identity and their
thoughts on Taiwan’s political status in the world. Questions were also asked on the subject of
language use and maintenance and how its effects on their sense of Taiwaneseness. Questions
were also asked about what they thought made Taiwan different from China. All of the standard
questions asked during the interviews can be found in the appendix. Demographic information
such as age, gender, and ethno-racial identification can be found in the participant profile found
at the beginning of the next chapter.
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Flaws and Limitations
In terms of limitations, since all of the research conducted was done so without external
funding, all expense, such as travel, printing, equipment, and etc. came from my own personal
expenses. Language also becomes a limitation, though all of the questions asked were in English,
it may be possible that some of the answers were mentally translated from one language to
another, such as a family’s migration story. Though all of their information will be anonymous
and voluntary, participants might not answer honestly in fear of Chinese criticism. In terms of
language and translations, there are two systems used, Wade-Giles (more prominent in Taiwan)
and pinyin (more prominent in China).12 In some instances, there may be the use of both, but I
will try to make sure a majority of the spellings are in pinyin. Pinyin is chosen because it is what
more widely used and the form of spelling that I grew up with.
Due to my position as a Taiwanese American, those interviewed may have left out
information that they believe I already know due to our shared ancestral history. Census data
may also be misrepresentative of Taiwanese Americans as they have identified in three ways in
the past, specifically as Taiwanese, Chinese, or Taiwanese and Chinese. Per the 2010 U.S.
Census, which is conducted every ten years for the total population and the distribution of the
electoral college conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, it must also be noted that Taiwanese
Americans had to check “other Asian” then write in Taiwanese, which may have left many
without actually writing in Taiwanese. The American Community Survey, on the other hand,
does have Taiwan listed as a place of origin, but does not require the total population of the U.S.
to respond. Though there is a large Taiwanese American population, my sample size is relatively
small with only 9 participants which I acknowledge does not completely tell the story of post12

For instance, the Wade-Giles spelling for 李登輝 (Taiwan’s first freely elected president) is
Lee Tung-hui, whereas the pinyin spelling is Lǐ Dēnghuī.
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martial law Taiwanese Americans. Though there are only a few participants, their voices,
thoughts, and opinions are still important in defining Taiwanese American identity.
Chapter Three: Data Analysis
To provide some context about those that I interviewed, I have provided a brief
description of the participants’ family background and demographic information.
Participant Profile
Russell – 22-year old male who was born in America. His parents are both from Taiwan but now
reside in the U.S. His mother is Hakka Taiwanese and his father is Hokkien Taiwanese. He is a
first generation student who has received his Bachelor in East Asian Languages and Culture and
is currently working on his Masters in Public Health. He has spent time in Europe and China for
university study abroad programs and has been to Taiwan for family visits.
Stanley – 24-year old male who was born in Taiwan but has been living in the U.S. for several
years and strongly identifies as Taiwanese American. He states that he is 75 percent Taiwanese
and 25 percent Aborigine but does not recall from which tribe. He has attended high school and
university in the U.S. He has recently graduated with his Bachelors in psychology and is looking
for work.
Samuel – 19-year old male who was born in the U.S. and identifies as half Taiwanese and half
Chinese with one parent hailing from mainland China while the other comes from Taiwan. He is
still in college and working to receive his Bachelors in Computer Science.
Aaron – 21-year old male who identifies as Taiwanese. Both of his parents are from Taiwan. His
mother’s side of the family moved from China to Taiwan during Mao’s rise to power while his
father’s side of the family has lived in Taiwan for many generations. He is currently a student
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working on his Bachelors in biology with the intent of pursuing pharmacology in the future. He
has spent multiple summers in Taiwan and has taught English there, but hopes to travel more.
Valerie – 24-year old female who identifies as both Chinese American and Taiwanese American.
She was originally born in Taiwan but has spent a majority of her life in the U.S. Both of her
parents are from Taiwan but now reside in the U.S. She has her Bachelors and is currently
pursuing her Masters in Nursing. She goes to Taiwan every couple of years with her family for
business purposes. She recently went to Taiwan for a summer by herself and has also traveled
throughout Southeast Asia.
Anne – 20-year old female who identifies as Taiwanese American. She was born in Taipei but
has lived in the U.S. since the age of three. Both of her parents reside in the U.S. She is currently
pursuing her Bachelor’s degree. She has gone back to Taiwan on multiple occasions since
moving to the U.S. to visit relatives that still live on the island.
Emelia – 18-year old female who identifies as half Taiwanese and half Caucasian. Her mother is
from Chiayi County, Taiwan and her father is from the US, both of whom are residing in the U.S.
She was born in the U.S., spent one year living in Taiwan as a child, and has been back to
Taiwan to visit family. She is currently in her first year of university working on her Bachelor’s
degree in communications.
James – 24-year old male who identifies as Taiwanese American. He was born and raised in the
U.S., but has been to Taiwan several times to visit family. Both of his parents are from Taiwan
and reside in the US. He has received his Bachelors in psychology and intends to pursue his
masters in the near future.
Daniel – 27-year old male who was born in the US but spent a large portion of his childhood in
Taiwan. Both of his parents are from Taiwan, but his grandparents all have different
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identifications. His maternal grandfather comes from China, his paternal grandfather is 16th or
17th generation Taiwanese, his paternal grandmother is Aboriginal Taiwanese, and he is unsure
whether his maternal grandmother is Taiwanese or Japanese. He is currently pursuing his PhD in
Linguistic Anthropology.
Taiwanese Americans On Language
Knowing the Taiwanese language was not necessary when it came to identifying as
Taiwanese or Taiwanese American. J.F. Dupré finds that many Taiwanese in Taiwan have not
maintained the Taiwanese language and that Mandarin has become the lingua franca of the
country due to the KMTs language policies that were in place for so long (Dupré, 2013).
Mandarin has also been the dominant language taught to Taiwanese Americans. Anne points out
that Mandarin is rather important to maintain. When asked about maintain her knowledge of
Taiwanese and Mandarin she said, “Taiwanese not so much, but Chinese and Mandarin in
general is important to me because it connects me and my relatives. . . Maintaining a working
knowledge of how to speak Chinese at some level is important to me” (Personal Interview,
09/22/2016) which indicates the dominance placed on Mandarin. When asked about his grasp on
the Taiwanese language, Stanley stated something similar as he said, “I know the basic words
and stuff like that but not that much anymore. . . I mean I can understand it because it’s pretty
easily understandable but then I would have to respond in Mandarin” (Personal Interview,
10/23/2016). In Stanley’s context, Mandarin is again the dominant language featured in his
lexicon, with the exception of English. Another difficulty of learning Taiwanese as a Taiwanese
American from their parents may be related to the parents’ command of the Taiwanese language
or their parents’ willingness to teach the language as Valerie points out:
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I mean, eventually it would be nice to know it but I mean my parents barely know it but
they struggle too [sic], you know and if that’s the case then I’m just screwed, that’s what
I think. I don’t know how I’m going to do it. Plus, it’s like one of those things like where
can I find teachers for Taiwanese? (Personal Interview, 08/20/2016)
Other participants have also stated that they would be interested in someday learning Taiwanese,
but it is not a need in their life. Another participant, Aaron, in reference to when he speaks with
his parents said “Taiwanese is almost impossible for me to understand what they are trying to say
but I’m trying to learn a little bit of it” (Personal Interview, 08/20/2016). Like Aaron, Stanley
echoed a similar sentiment about the Taiwanese language. When asked about possibly learning
Taiwanese in the future Stanley said “I don’t see how, I don’t see any practical reasons for it but
for personal interests, yes” (Personal Interview, 10/23/2016). The participant knows the
importance of language but again, the importance of Taiwanese is not a pressing issue, but rather
knowing Mandarin was more beneficial even though they identify as Taiwanese. When ask about
the importance of learning and maintaining languages Aaron said:
Yeah, of course. Of course it’s important to learn about your heritage, where you’re from,
keep the tradition going on. I mean speaking Chinese it helps me a lot because I can
communicate with other people who have difficulty speaking English around me.
(Personal Interview, 08/20/2016)
But when asked about the importance of learning and maintaining Taiwanese, Aaron’s
perspective changes. He goes on to say:
Taiwanese is not as important because it is not as, it’s not widely used. It’s mostly used
by the southerners from Taiwan but I mean I would like to learn a little bit so I can
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understand sometimes what’s going on because that’s what my dad speaks most of the
time. (Personal Interview, 08/20/2016)
It is also associated with the Taiwan’s physical demography. Daniel, who prefers to use English
and Japanese during his time in Taiwan, also knows Taiwanese and learned it from his father’s
family. When asked about his use of Taiwanese he said “not that much, unless I am in Southern
Taiwan. That would be where Taiwanese is more of a dominant language as supposed to
Mandarin. That would be where I would use but only really in this situation” (Personal Interview,
10/07/2016). The Taiwanese language is associated with rural or low-class Taiwanese people or
only spoken by people living in southern Taiwan, which Su (2008) points out in her study.
Taiwanese was associated with low class when I spoke with Stanley. In my conversation with
him about learning Taiwanese he said a couple things, specifically saying:
I learned Taiwanese but that’s from watching the TV shows that were in Taiwanese. And
then also I guess some of the schools I went to were pretty were in a pretty ghetto area
[emphasis added] so a lot of people there spoke Taiwanese, mostly . . . well obviously the
teacher didn’t, but the kids did. (Personal Interview, 10/23/2016)
In this conversation, “ghetto” is associated with speaking Taiwanese. It should be noted that
many of the participants have stated that they did not have a firm grasp of Taiwanese, only on
Mandarin, though many of them still identify as Taiwanese American. Many of the informants
had mentioned that they had learned a hybrid of the two languages, with the Mandarin being the
dominant language with Taiwanese words sprinkled in throughout their lexicon.
Taiwanese American Participants with KMT Parents or Grandparents
Many of the participants did not know their family’s migration history from China to
Taiwan, which might indicate that those families’ came to Taiwan before the KMT fled from
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China. There were a couple participants who knew part of their families’ migration story from
China to Taiwan. Those who did know the story all had parents or grandparents that married
with the local population. Both of Stanley’s grandfathers came to Taiwan with the KMT but both
also married women and had kids with women born and raised in Taiwan. This is interesting
since Stanley has stated that he is very pro-independence for Taiwan. Looking at
intergenerational beliefs, the sense of reunification that his KMT grandfathers most likely had as
nationalist did not translate into Stanley’s life. A similar situation is present for Aaron. His
maternal grandparents also fled to Taiwan when Mao came to power. Similar to Stanley’s family,
Aaron’s mother, whom he did not say supported independence or not, married his father, a local
Taiwan man. Again, in terms of intergenerational beliefs, the reunification beliefs that Aaron’s
grandparents may have had are not an important factor in Aaron’s life, especially since he has
also talked about international recognition for Taiwan. Daniel, who has one grandfather from
China was ambiguous about his stance on unification and independence, more rather he
supported what the Taiwanese people wanted as long as there was more consistency saying:
I would go with the one that set up a really clear plan, so I mean that has to be something
that the people decide, I mean the Taiwanese people, they decide it. If they decided to
have this unification, then it will happen and if it sets a really clear rule then I could
support that. And then if they decided to do independence then I would support that as
well as they have that clear plan, but then if every four years they are doing this
independence thing and then the other four years they are tearing down what the other did,
then there is no way, for me, to invest my time in that. (Personal Interview, 10/07/2016)
Daniel’s perspective is an interesting one as he isn’t outwardly vocal about a side, but rather
supports the opinions of Taiwanese citizens, as long as they form a consistent long term
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consensus. This would be an interesting topic to study in Taiwan and in Taiwanese Americans.
Unfortunately, Aaron, Stanley, and Daniel were the only participants who had family who came
to Taiwan as post-1949 Mainlanders so it is difficult to further explore the thoughts of the KMT
descendants. The variation between KMT and Taiwanese Hokkien migration history challenges
the idea that Taiwan and China have a common history and culture seeing that Taiwan had been
under Japanese control, where a Japanese identity was enforced for half a century. Taiwan did
not really embody Chinese nationalism until the KMT came and implemented a stringent form of
Sinification. Taiwan had hardly been a part of China when the KMT arrived.
Taiwanese Americans and embedded relationships with Japan
Japanese colonization and its imprint on Taiwanese people is also relevant in my
discussions with some of those that I interviewed. Reiterating the importance of education in the
post-marital law era it is important to mention that “The young generation in Taiwan has
departed from the set pattern of the Party and state education in the past and raised the
atmosphere to appreciate and learn from neighboring countries” (Zhang, 2009, p. 45). As
mentioned, all of the participants had learned Mandarin Chinese at some point in their lives. It’s
important to note that Japanese language and culture is connected to several participants in a
contemporary fashion. Though many of the participants never mentioned Japanese colonization
directly, and have spent large portions of their lives in the U.S., several have taken it upon
themselves to learn Japanese, partake in Japanese cultural events, and/or travel to Japan. This
might exemplify an interest in their embedded colonial past, an important aspect in one’s identity.
When asked about possibly living abroad Aaron specifically said he would live in Japan. When
asked why he wanted to live in Japan he said,
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Because I’ve taken four years of Japanese in high school and I really like Japan in general.
I’m also taking Japanese again right now this semester, learning new stuff. But I find the
culture really interesting and… Yeah it’s probably another place that I would want to
live in Asia if anything. (Personal Interview, 08/20/2016)
Others have taken Japanese language and culture, have been to Japan, or have done both. Anne
had also mentioned that she had been to Japan twice in her lifetime, once on a tour with family
from Taiwan and another trip that she went on directly out of the U.S. She had also mentioned
that she felt unmotivated to learn Chinese and instead expressed interest in Japanese later in her
life. In her words she said:
I had a hard time keeping up in Chinese School, especially towards the end, towards sixth
grade. I don’t know. I didn’t feel motivated I guess so I didn’t go anymore. I’m not
exactly sure but it was just really hard for me to remember all of the characters and I still
speak fluently, conversationally, but now I can’t really read or write . . . I ended up taking
Japanese for my language classes in high school. (Personal Interview, 09/22/2016)
Stanley also mentioned that he had been to Japan with family for vacations. Stanley also stated
that he and his family had been to Japan and had travelled extensively as a kid. When talking
about his travels he said “I guess we use to go everywhere like for example, Japan. Taiwanese
people love [emphasis added] going to Japan, it’s like a vacation, get on a plane, two hours and
you are there. So we use to go to Japan, Okinawa, Sapporo” (Personal Interview, 10/23/2016)
among other places that he had been to. He also brings up the unique Sino-Japanese identity that
has manifested in Taiwan. When ask about how he would describe Taiwan to people who know
nothing about the country, he said:

61

I've always described to people who didn’t understand who Taiwan was as a lovechild
between China and Japan. We have taken obviously the history, the customs, we preserve
the Chinese customs better than China itself . . . And we also were able to benefit from a
lot of infrastructure investment from Japan. I'm sure that, I mean I’m not that familiar, I
guess I’m decently familiar with my history because I care about it . . . but from what I
understand they invested a lot of infrastructure and a lot of cultural norms and educations.
They invested a lot in the country so in a lot of ways we are similar to Japan and in a lot
of ways we are similar to China. I would like to think of us as a pretty cool blend between
the two. (Personal Interview, 10/23/2016)
Stanley, who had spent a large portion of his life in Taiwan, reminds us of the importance of
education in Taiwan and the need to explore Taiwan’s history, how the island benefited
educationally from the Japanese, and how there is a definite blend in Sino-Japanese culture in
Taiwan. His view also aligns with Leo T.S. Ching’s (2003) work as there is some remnants of
Japanization in Taiwan and that the indigenization of Taiwanese people incorporates both
Chinese and Japanese aspects. The most interesting case of Japanese identity in the participants
was in Daniel, who spoke of his grandmother’s fluency of the Japanese language and how she
was keen on teaching him Japanese as he grew-up. In talking about his family history, he knew
that his maternal grandfather was from China, his maternal grandmother was Aboriginal
Taiwanese, his paternal grandfather was a 16th or 17th generation Taiwanese, but was unsure of
his maternal grandmother’s identity on whether she was Japanese or Taiwanese. In describing his
grandmother, he said:
I don’t really know about my grandma. She seems to be a Taiwanese but at the same time
some of like her, like the name for example, seems to have some sign of that she might be
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a Japanese or something, but I don’t know. They don’t never talk about that; you know
that was in that era. So I would assume like Taiwanese, let’s leave it at that. (Personal
Interview, 10/07/2016).
When he talked about learning Japanese in the first place he pointed out his grandmother’s effort
in teaching him the language saying:
my grandma started like giving me some Japanese language books and stuff, trying to get
me to know the language or whatever and I didn’t really pick up that really fast at all
since you know she didn’t really even use that but was giving me the instruction books
like for the what they would call the beginner level material. So that kind of started my
interest in Japanese from a really early age. (Personal Interview, 10/07/2016)
Daniel also went on to talk about his exploration of Japanese as he got older. He eventually
declared the language as his official second language in high school and had even considered
living in Japan at some point in during his life:
by the time I turned senior I passed the Japanese, the first level test. So basically I was
considered a competent Japanese speaker and at the same time back then I was think
about going to Japan. First of all, for the exchange program and then I was also back then
was [sic] already thinking about working over there instead of coming here and for me
back then it was more like maybe I could stay in Japan for a while and eventually come
back to the states for good. (Personal Interview, 10/07/2016)
Though the KMT worked rigorously to eradicate the Japanization that took place in Taiwan, it is
obvious that Japan is an important part of Taiwanese identity, even in Taiwanese Americans as
exhibited in Daniel’s case. The Taiwanese-Japanese relationship is of strong interest for
Taiwanese Americans, which is evident as multiple have talked about visiting Japan, learning
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Japanese language and culture, and possibly living in Japan. Much like those who live in Taiwan,
this is a reminder that Taiwanese American identity still encompasses Sinification and
Japanization.
Taiwanese Americans and Their Travels
The participants also affirm that Taiwanese people are well travelled and are very aware
of Taiwan’s geopolitical situation, which echoes Copper’s (2003) findings. Russell, Stanley,
Anne, Valarie, Daniel, and Aaron had all talked about their past travels. Every participant has
been to Taiwan at least once in their life and all of them still have family ties to the island, which
often serves as their reason to visit. There are also multiple participants who have spent an
extended (more than three months) amounts of time in Taiwan or were born there. When asked
whether they would ever live in Taiwan, multiple had stated that they would someday be
interested in doing so, along with living in other areas of the world. When asked about possibly
living in Taiwan, Russell was enthusiastic about it and said:
Yes, I have . . . I know that I would be able to find a job there as an educator, most likely.
I know it wouldn’t take a great deal of education on my end . . . in combination with
working, I would be able to see family that I haven’t seen in a long time and experience
something different, immerse myself in the language and culture for a longer period of
time. (Personal Interview, 08/29/2016)
Russell was not the only who has entertained the idea of living in Taiwan. When asked about
living in Taiwan in the future, Aaron said, “Yes and no. Right now I don’t have Taiwanese
Citizenship and I’d have to apply for a visa. You can’t live there for more than 90 days, so yeah,
I have considered living there” (Personal Interview, 08/20/2016). Emelia, who lived in Taiwan
for a year as a child and has dual U.S. and Taiwanese citizenship, also expressed interest in
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living in Taiwan. In her explanation she said, “I kind of want to live there just for a little while
just because my dad did and my mom did and I think it would be important for me to go live
there” (Personal Interview, 09/19/2016). As per Model (2015), going back to Taiwan for an
extended amount of time in their lives affirms for the participants the notion that many
Taiwanese eventually go back to Taiwan sometime during their professional career or at
retirement. Though Model’s study was conducted on Taiwanese born individuals in America, it
is similar for Taiwanese Americans as multiple participants expressed interest in returning for
more than a vacation.
Taiwanese Americans on Taiwan’s International Participation
Informants also brought up the issue of Taiwan’s participation on the world stage and
having to compromise Taiwan’s name in order to participate in events such as the Olympics.
Venting their frustrations, some called the situation “really dumb”, “malarkey”, and feeling
“offended.” When talking about international recognition, Emilia said, “I wish it were just more
recognized universally as its own place, as its own country instead of like the Olympics with like
Chinese Taipei” (Personal Interview, 09/19/2016). For her, it seems like the name Chinese
Taipei continues to serve as a reminder of the lack of recognition Taiwan has. Aaron, who called
the situation “really dumb” stated various times his displeasures with the Chinese Taipei name
and how there is a desire to be properly recognized by the international sports community. Aaron
would go on to say:
some of the things in Taiwan like the sports teams called Chinese Taipei. . . I just find
that really dumb. We are just called Taiwan. I just refer to us as Taiwan. . . I don’t think
we should be called Chinese Taipei. . . I think we should just be called Taiwan. It doesn’t
make sense why we are called that other than because we had some agreement with
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China a long time ago about naming our sports teams Chinese Taipei representing as
Chinese Taipei. (Personal Interview, 08/20/2016)
When asked about Taiwan’s position in the world, Aaron said “I think being part of the U.N. is
our next step that we need to take, or the government needs to push forward for it” (Personal
Interview, 08/20/2016) which continues the theme for international recognition and participation.
Often times participants had also mentioned how they would like to see more recognition for
Taiwan. Stanley was the most outwardly vocal participant on the subject. He sounded angered by
the subject and thought the Chinese Taipei name was not helpful for Taiwan’s international
status. During our conversation about Taiwan’s international status he was saying:
I want to see countries acknowledging you know Taiwan instead of like Chinese Taipei,
you know like the f*cking Olympics like what the f*ck is that bullsh*t? So you know, not
Chinese Taipei. Taiwan, the name is Taiwan. You got to make sure all the other countries
get that correctly instead of succumbing to the pressure of China. (Personal Interview,
10/23/2016)
The continual use of expletives clearly demonstrates the frustration with the lack of recognition
that Taiwan receives. Stanley, like the others, believes that the Taiwanese team should be
allowed to compete under the name, Taiwan. This coincides with the development of Taiwanese
identity and the disdain associated with the Chinese Taipei name placed upon the nations
Olympic team and how Taiwanese identity is a main prohibitory factor in the acceptance of the
Olympic name (Xu, 2006).
Taiwanese Americans on Independence and Identity
All of the participants are aware of Taiwan’s international political status and the issue of
formal independence. Regardless of China’s claims, several participants believe Taiwan is an
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independent country and recognize that there are differences between the two nation-states. They
also spoke about China’s imposition on Taiwan and how they viewed Taiwan as different from
China. When asked if she thought Taiwan was an independent country, Anne said yes and
followed up saying “I feel like . . . for those of us who think that Taiwan is its own independent
country I guess there’s more of like a pride (emphasis added) in the fact” (Personal Interview,
09/22/2016). Emilia was also vocal on her thoughts about China and Taiwan, she too viewed
Taiwan as different from China and wished Taiwan got the recognition that it deserves. Tired of
having people placing Chinese identity on her, she said:
With people just assuming that I’m Chinese and then when I tell someone I’m Taiwanese
sometimes they are like ‘oh that’s like pretty much the same.’ I wish it weren’t like that. I
wish it was recognized as a whole different thing . . . like they have their own
government, they have their own culture, they have their own history, I think China's
view of Taiwan being their own is just not, I don’t really view it as being accurate
because Taiwan has their own language too, like they have kind of their own everything
so I think being Taiwanese is completely different from being Chinese. (Personal
Interview, 09/19/2016)
Similarly, James also has to correct people when encountering the generalized Chinese identity
that is often placed on Taiwanese Americans. When asked about what he tells others, he says:
I will correct them and say that I am Taiwanese because I do see that there is a difference,
I recognize the difference between the two and I feel like it is an opportunity to educate
people on kind of the politics and the cultural differences between the two. (Personal
Interview, 07/09/2016)
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Samuel also made a similar statement about the differences between China and Taiwan, mainly
pointing to the differences in governance, economics, and cultures. When asked about what he
thought was different between China and Taiwan he said:
Taiwanese people are a lot more peaceful, they have a democratic government, and they
vote and they have very good relations with the US. . . China, I mean they claim to be
like getting to democracy but I mean people that are from there would know that it’s not
that close. I would say politics, the economy, and even the peoples and the cultures are
very different. (Personal Interview, 08/05/2016)
Identity was a topic for a couple of the participants, specifically mentioning the problem they’ve
faced in terms of identity. Russell, who had travelled to China to study Chinese language and
culture, specifically recalls issues pertaining to his identity. In talking about obtaining his visa to
go to China he recalls being told not to mention that he was Taiwanese and described the
statement as a horrible feeling. In response to how he felt about being told not to state that he
was Taiwanese he said:
it was odd because it is an identity that you can’t hide from people, if you say, say you
are a citizen of the U.S., being this (refereeing to his racial composition), that you see like
you can’t easily hide it from other people. Whereas if you were to hypothetically go
somewhere like China and have people that look relatively similar to you on a superficial
standpoint [emphasis added] you can somewhat blend in. (Personal Interview,
08/29/2016)
He knows that his racial profile makes him look like the others around him in China, but he
knows that his physical features are not the only traits that define him or his identity. Though he
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knows the difference, he still had to deal with this identity issue in China. Russell continues to
talk about his identity in China and expands by saying:
Aside from the superficial standpoint having one of the only things other than size that
like make me different from a lot of these people would be family lineage and my
connection [emphasis added] to Taiwan and having that part of your identity that you
claimed and still claim even in areas where you immediately stand out, it’s like being
stripped of a title, it’s like being stripped of a part of who you are [emphasis added] when
you can’t tell people I come from here or my family is here. (Personal Interview,
08/29/2016)
It is obvious in his response that he is uncomfortable with having to deny his identity and
Taiwan’s relationship with China. He also believes that identity goes beyond how one looks like
compared to another, but is much deeper in terms of the identity he gets to claim. He goes further
by questioning the Cross-Strait relationship by saying “what good has China served Taiwan
aside from trade and the occasional person who runs from China?” clearly displaying discontent
with how China views Taiwan. Stanley was also explicit about his opinion on Taiwanese identity
and China’s stance on Taiwan. When ask about the subject he said:
I feel like the country is underrepresented and we suffer a huge identity crisis . . . I
believe that the Taiwanese people deserve to have their identity solidified and not have
other people claim them as theirs. I would compare that to how we don’t call the United
States England just because most of the people speak English and come from there . . . I
guess we left to start our own country, to make our own life and we don’t want to have
too much to do with where we came from. We came here, we have our own ideas, let us
do our own thing. Don’t claim us as part of you when we are very much different.
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Anyone that’s been to both places, both China and Taiwan, would be able to tell you that
they are very, very different. (Personal Interview, 10/23/2016)
Opinions on identity and differences between China and Taiwan, whether it be cultural,
economic, or political, continue to be factors in distinguishing themselves from China and
identifying as Taiwanese. For Taiwanese Americans, there is a problem with the recognition of
their identity that coincides with Taiwan’s international political status. Without formal
recognition, particularly by the U.N., Taiwanese Americans continue to suffer from the same
identity crisis that Taiwan itself suffers. The issue of identity will continue to be present and
serves as an important reason in conducting research on differentiating factors for Taiwan and
Taiwanese Americans.
Quick Analysis of Taiwanese Identity Poll Data
Though it was not collected out of participants, poll data is also reflective of the
developing opinions on Taiwan’s status. No polls currently exist that targets Taiwanese
Americans that look into their thoughts on Taiwan’s status with China, therefore information on
the subject is taken from those living in Taiwan. In supporting the opinions of the participating
Taiwanese Americans and their thoughts on future calls for independence and personal
identification, poll data indicates a rise in support of future independence in Taiwan and a rise in
those calling themselves Taiwanese. It should be noted that Taiwanese people, according to an
annual poll conducted by the National Cheng Chi University in Taiwan, are steadily moving
towards maintaining the status quo while favoring formal independence for their state at a later
time with 19 percent of those who were polled vying for this option in 2016, two times larger
than 1996, when the first democratic elections took place in Taiwan. The inverse has occurred in
those who wish to maintain the status quo while favoring unification with China at a later date.
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Of those polled in 2016, only 8 percent responded in favor of maintaining the status quo while
favoring unification with China later, down from 19.5 percent that favored this option in 1996. In
another poll conducted by the same university, since 1996 there has been a rise in those who
identify as Taiwanese and a drop in those who identify as Chinese or both Chinese and
Taiwanese. Political opinion along with thoughts on Taiwanese independence amongst different
generations becomes even more interesting as those living during the White Terror (1949-1987)
get older, with half of Taiwan’s current population were born during this era (Census.gov).
Chapter Four: Conclusion and Discussion
The future of Taiwan will continue to be an interesting topic to broach as a majority of
the islands inhabitants remain wary about the future direction that their nation-state should go in.
When combining the “maintain status quo, decide at later date” and “maintain status quo
indefinitely” it makes up 59.6 percent of those polled (NCCU, 2016). Many of the participants
also voice concerns about the future wellbeing of Taiwan and how they hope that independence
will someday be achieved. Bound by history, politics, and economics in the U.S., Taiwanese
Americans will continue to be an integral part for the fight for Taiwanese rights as they bridge
the relationship with America and Taiwan. History, language, culture, and politics are all
subjects that Taiwanese Americans use to distinguish themselves from the Chinese identity that
is inadvertently placed on them.
The history of Taiwan and China and Taiwanese Americans and Chinese Americans vary
to the point where they are not necessarily shared histories. Taiwan has been through the hand of
Dutch and Japanese colonizers, swift Sinification by the KMT, and the development of a
democratic government. China, on the other hand, went through their own revolutions, the fall of
the Qing dynasty, the inception of the KMT, and the rise of communism, none of which Taiwan
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was originally involved with. Though the KMT did eventually establish their control in Taiwan,
it was not without losing mainland China and the eventual loss of international legitimacy.
Taiwanese Americans came to the U.S. under political circumstance, unlike the economic
narrative that many Chinese people came under in their search for Gold Mountain.
Taiwanese Americans hold a unique place in Taiwan’s independence, democracy, and
identity, while also hold a unique place in the space of America’s history. They served as one of
the driving forces for immigration reform in the U.S. and continues to make an impact on U.S.
society, especially through their work in organization such as FAPA. The relationship between
the U.S., Taiwan, and China will continue to be a sensitive issue for the foreseeable future,
particularly since Taiwanese people recently elected a pro-independence leaning president, Tsai
Ing-wen. The relationship will also grow to become more sensitive as the first generation prounification KMT members begin to die off and the second and third generation KMT get older.
As China’s government and economics becomes more powerful and Taiwanese people become
more vocal, it will be compelling to see how Cross-Strait relationships will develop as both sides
pursue their own agendas. It will also become even more important for Taiwanese Americans to
maintain their identity as China continues to attempt to force its identity and ideas on Taiwan.
Several trends were evident in the thoughts of Taiwanese Americans. One of the most
riveting were the opinions of those who are decedents of people who came to Taiwan with the
KMT and their thoughts on independence. As mentioned before, there were only three
participants who had relatives who came to Taiwan with the KMT, making the sample size small.
From an intergenerational perspective, they are interesting because they do not hold onto the
same pro-unification stance that their parents or grandparents had. Two out of the three support
eventual independence for Taiwan, while the third was more concerned about the consistency of
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Taiwan’s political planning. It is an interesting observation as indigenization in Taiwan has taken
root even though Japan and the KMT for a century enforced the identity that they wanted to see.
The policies that the KMT implemented during their rule have had a lasting impact that is
evident in Taiwan’s society, but the colonization of Taiwan by Japan can also be found
Taiwanese American identity.
Embracing Japanese culture, whether it is through education or travel, continues to be an
important topic for a multitude of Taiwanese Americans and Taiwanese people all together.
Taiwan’s relationship with Japan also holds a unique place in Taiwan’s history and development
as Japan helped modernize Taiwan during the former empires rule and serves as a launching
point for Taiwan’s diaspora. It was the KMT that attempted to eradicate any traces of Japanese
identity and sentiment, but since the end of martial law, many Taiwanese people have gone to
explore this embedded identity. As a reminder, since 1990, the amount of Taiwanese people
going to Japan for business or leisure has continued to increase. Many of the participants also
talked about Japan, mentioning their travels there and their practice of Japanese language and
culture. Some have talked about living there and working there, while others have talked about
how their respective families would often visit Japan. Though most never directly mentioned
Japanese colonization, it is evident that Japanese culture is imbedded in the identity of these
Taiwanese Americans. At the expense of the native languages in Taiwan, the development and
implementation of language policies were central to controlling identity in Taiwan’s population
for the Japanese empire and the KMT government in Taiwan.
Language continues to be an identifier for the different ethnic groups in Taiwan, but it
does not necessarily find importance in Taiwanese Americans. Many of the participants knew
Mandarin and saw Taiwanese as a language to be learned out of personal interest, not necessity.
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Though the Taiwanese language has historically been one of the ways to distinguish between
benshengren and waishengren, it does not do so for Taiwanese Americans. Many of those
interviewed stated that they did not have a firm grasp on Taiwanese, though they are interested in
learning it in the future. There are several reasons as to why the Taiwanese language is not often
spoken by Taiwanese Americans. The parents of Taiwanese Americans might not have a firm
grasp of Taiwanese, as showcased by Valarie’s explanation, making it difficult for Taiwanese
Americans to learn the language outside of Taiwan. Another reason may be due to the fact that
Taiwanese Americans do not have a strong, vested interest in learning the language. Multiple
participants stated that they were interested in learning it for personal reasons but it did not take
precedent in their lives. It may also have to do with the fact that Taiwanese is still seen as a lowclass language only spoken by the rural, poor, and uneducated. Though there is a resurgence in
the language, there is still a negative stigma connected to it, a consequence of the KMTs
nationalization of Mandarin.
Outside of the use of Taiwanese, another trend that was evident in the Taiwanese
American participants was the concern for Taiwan’s international reputation and future. It is
important to note that many have openly expressed their concerns for Taiwan’s future and what
they would like to see their ancestral home country become. One of the topics often mentioned
was the Olympics and the name Chinese Taipei in place of Taiwan. Many participants voiced
their displeasure with the name and found it to be irritating. Some found the name used to
appease China as demeaning and harmful to Taiwanese people and the nation-states reputation in
the world. Concern over Taiwan’s international status is also of concern for Taiwanese
Americans, especially in Taiwan’s quest for U.N. recognition, international participation, and the
development of formal relationships with other nation-states. Often vexed by being categorized
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as Chinese, many have also outwardly spoken about their Taiwanese identity and how they
someday hope for Taiwan’s formal independence. For many Taiwanese Americans, their sense
of Taiwanese identity does not have to do with language or physical appearance, rather it is
correlated with their connections to the island, whether that be the sense of historical belonging
due to multigenerational lineage on the island, relatives living in Taiwan, or the memories they
have of their time spent on the island.
With more time and resources, more Taiwanese Americans could have been interviewed.
More interviews could have also included other age groups to compare perspectives, and asked
additional questions about generational and familial practices, like languages, holidays, and
religion, and how they translate from one generation to another. For future studies, it would be
compelling to gather the unique perspectives of KMT decedents and their views on Taiwan’s
political status and future. It would also be captivating to look into the resurging interest of Japan
for Taiwanese people and their history with Japanization, how culturally Japanese traits have
been maintained, and the thoughts of those who lived during Taiwan’s era of Japanization. The
use of the Taiwanese language in the U.S. and the preservation of the language by successional
generations of Taiwanese Americans would also be an interesting topic to broach in the future,
particularly because the language is reemerging in Taiwan.
In conclusion, Taiwanese American identity needs to be further explored as they bridge
the relationship between Taiwan and America. All Taiwanese Americans bring unique stories,
perspectives, and voices that shape Taiwanese American identity and what it means to be
Taiwanese American. Triangulated between the U.S., Taiwan, and China, Taiwanese Americans
continue to ponder and balance their position in the world while also reflecting on Taiwan’s
geopolitical predicament and the development of Taiwanese identity. As Taiwanese and
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Taiwanese Americans use language, economics, and politics as means to demarcate themselves
from China, Taiwanese Americans also use their memories and relatives as their source of
difference in defiance of Chinese identity. In terms of commonality, both parties are concerned
about the future of Taiwan and the future development of Cross-Strait relationships. Both groups
are aware of the ongoing issues of recognition that Taiwan continues to face and have been
outspoken in their opinions. Taiwanese American history and identity serves as just one reminder
of the varying ethnic groups found in the U.S. and should be continued to be explored in order to
understand American history, Taiwanese history, and international relations between the U.S.,
Taiwan, and China. Taiwanese Americans have historically played a role in defining their sense
of separation from mainland China, attachments to Taiwan, and the fight for Taiwanese rights
and will continue to do so as Taiwan continues to define itself in a world where their sovereignty
is not formally recognized.

76

Bibliography
2014 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Office of Immigration Statistics. Department of
Homeland Security. - ois_yb_2014.pdf. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_yb_2014.pdf
An, S. (2016). AsianCrit Perspective on Social Studies. The Journal of Social Studies Research.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jssr.2016.06.002
Anderson, B. R. O. (2006). Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism. London ; New York : Verso, 2006.
Andrade, T. (2006). The rise and fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624-1662: cooperative colonialization
and the statist model of European expansion. Journal of World History, 17(4), 429–450.
Chabot, S. (2016, September 15). Text - H.R.6047 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): Taiwan Travel
Act [legislation]. Retrieved October 26, 2016, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/6047/text
Chang, S., 2. (2014). Racial Upside: Deconstructing the “Merits” of Jeremy Lin’s NBA Contract.
Virginia Sports & Entertainment Law Journal, 14(1), 1–12.
Chen, S.-C. (2006). Simultaneous Promotion of Indigenisation and Internationalisation: New
Language-in-education Policy in Taiwan. Language & Education: An International Journal,
20(4), 322–337. https://doi.org/10/2167/le632.0
Chen, S.-C. (2010). Multilingualism in Taiwan. International Journal of the Sociology of
Language, 2010(205), 79–104. https://doi.org/10.1515/IJSL.2010.040
Cheng, V. J. (2004). Inauthentic. [electronic resource] : the anxiety over culture and identity.
New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, ©2004. Retrieved from http://0-

77

search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00548a&AN=iusf.b
2148310&site=eds-live&scope=site
Chiang, Y., & Chen, T. (2015). Adopting the diasporic son: Jeremy Lin and Taiwan sport
nationalism: Fusion. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://0eds.b.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/eds/detail/detail?vid=54&sid=f8262103-bad8-48b19d2d6b5c1f745179%40sessionmgr107&hid=120&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmUmc2Nvc
GU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=edselc.2-52.0-84940201896&db=edselc
Ching, L. T. S. (2001). Becoming “Japanese” : colonial Taiwan and the politics of identity
formation. Berkeley : University of California Press, 2001.
Chow, K. (2016). Asian-Americans Continue To Drift Away From The GOP, But It’s A
Complicated Story. Retrieved October 13, 2016, from
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/10/12/497063888/asian-americans-continueto-drift-away-from-republicans-but-it-s-a-complicated-s
Cohen, Z. (2015, December 16). U.S. sells $1.83B of weapons to Taiwan over Chinese ire.
Retrieved October 23, 2016, from http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/16/politics/u-s-taiwanarms-sales/index.html
Combs, M. T., & Wasserstrom, J. N. (2013). The Guard’s Three Bodies: Linsanity, Celebrity and
National Identity. International Journal of the History of Sport, 30(11), 1259.
Copper, J. F. (2003). Taiwan : nation-state or province? Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 2003.
Diplomatic Allies - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) 中華民國外交部 全球資訊網英文網. (n.d.). Retrieved October 27, 2016, from

78

http%3a%2f%2fwww.mofa.gov.tw%2fen%2fAlliesIndex.aspx%3fn%3dDF6F8F246049F8
D6%26sms%3dA76B7230ADF29736
Dirlik, A., & Prazniak, R. (2011). The 1911 Revolution: An end and a beginning. China
Information, 25(3), 213.
Dumbaugh, K. (2009). Taiwan’s Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing
Implications. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from
http://archive.org/details/370851-taiwans-political-status-historical-background
Dupré, J.-F. (2013). In search of linguistic identities in Taiwan: an empirical study. Journal of
Multilingual & Multicultural Development, 34(5), 431.
Dupré, J.-F. (2014). The mother tongues as second languages: nationalism, democracy and
multilingual education in Taiwan. Current Issues in Language Planning, 15(4), 393.
Fleischauer, S. (2007). The 228 Incident and the Taiwan independence movement’s construction
of a Taiwanese identity. China Information, 21(3), 373–401.
Fuchs, C. (2016, September 19). As UN Prepares to Convene, Taiwanese Rally for Inclusion.
Retrieved October 27, 2016, from http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/unprepares-meet-taiwanese-rally-inclusion-n650531
Gao, P. (2010). Informing the present: the publication of a new series of Ming and Qing dynastyera documents is fueling a renewed interest in the study of Taiwan’s history. Taiwan Review,
60(5), 48–53.
Gold, T. B. (1985). State and society in the Taiwan miracle. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, [1985].
Griffiths, J. (2016, August 6). Olympics: Anger grows in Taiwan at having to compete as
“Chinese Taipei.” Retrieved November 4, 2016, from
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/05/sport/taiwan-olympics-chinese-taipei/index.html

79

Hickey, D. V. (2013). U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan: Time For Change? Asian Affairs: An
American Review, 40(4), 175–198. https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2013.847747
Ho, D. D. (2013). The Empire’s Scorched Shore: Coastal China, 1633-1683. Journal of Early
Modern History, 17(1), 53–74.
Hsiau, A. (1997). Language Ideology in Taiwan: The KMT’s Language Policy, the Tai-yu
Language Movement, and Ethnic Politics. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural
Development, 18(4), 302–15.
Hsu, J. Y. K. (2007). On Taiwan’s United Nations Membership. International Issues & Slovak
Foreign Policy Affairs, 16(3), 39–43.
Hsu, M. Y. (2012). The Disappearance of America’s Cold War Chinese Refugees, 1948-1966.
Journal of American Ethnic History, 31(4), 12–33.
Huang, L. (2016). The issues of islands governing in early Ming Dynasty. Journal of Marine and
Island Cultures, 5, 5–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.imic.2016.05.003
Huang, Y.-L., & Wang, C.-H. (2013). Chinese Question in the Olympic Movement: From the
Perspective of Taiwan. International Journal of the History of Sport, 30(17), 2052–2068.
Jimenez, T. R., & Horowitz, A. L. (2013). When white is just alright: how immigrants redefine
achievement and reconfigure the ethnoracial hierarchy. American Sociological Review, (5),
849. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122413497012
Kaeding, M. P. (2015). Resisting Chinese influence: social movements in Hong Kong and
Taiwan. Current History, 114(773), 210–216.
Kang, Y., & Yang, K. C. C. (2011). The Rhetoric of Ethnic Identity Construction Among
Taiwanese Immigrants in the United States. Howard Journal of Communications, 22(2),
163.

80

Kerr, G. H. (1976). Formosa betrayed. New York: Da Capo Press.
Kiang, L., Tseng, V., & Yip, T. (2016). Placing Asian American Child Development Within
Historical Context. Child Development, (4), 995. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12578
Kil, S. H. (2012). Fearing yellow, imagining white: media analysis of the Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882. Social Identities, 18(6), 663–677. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2012.708995
Kim, C. J. (1999). The racial triangulation of Asian Americans. Politics and Society, 27(1), 105–
138.
Lee, C. (2010). “Where the Danger Lies”: Race, Gender, and Chinese and Japanese Exclusion in
the United States, 1870–1924. Sociological Forum, 25(2), 248–271.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1573-7861.2010.01175.x
Lee, E. (2002). Enforcing the Borders: Chinese Exclusion along the U.S. Borders with Canada
and Mexico, 1882-1924. The Journal of American History, (1), 54.
Lee, E. (2015). The making of Asian America : a history. New York : Simon & Schuster, 2015.
Lee, J. H. X. (2015). History of Asian Americans: Exploring Diverse Roots : Exploring Diverse
Roots. Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood. Retrieved from http://0search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=936697&s
ite=ehost-live&scope=site
Liao, D.-C., Chen, B., & Huang, C. (2013). The decline of “Chinese identity” in Taiwan?! An
analysis of survey data from 1992 to 2012. East Asia: An International Quarterly, 30(4),
273–290.
Lien, P.-T. (2014). Democratization and Citizenship Education Changing Identity Politics and
Shifting Paradigms of Teaching and Learning in Taiwan. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, (2),
25.

81

Lin, J. (2016a, September 27). U.S. Senator Calls For Lifting Of All Restrictions On High-Level
Visits From Taiwan Including The President. Retrieved from http://fapa.org/wp/2016/09/us-senator-calls-for-lifting-of-all-restrictions-on-high-level-visits-from-taiwan-including-thepresident/
Lin, J. (2016b, October 28). House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce Urges
Census Bureau To Add “Taiwanese” Check-Off Box In Census 2020 Form / 美國眾議院外
交委員會主席羅伊斯要求人口普查局在 2020 的人口普查表上將「台灣人」列入正式
選項 (October 28, 2016). Retrieved from http://fapa.org/wp/2016/10/house-foreign-affairscommittee-chairman-ed-royce-urges-census-bureau-to-add-taiwanese-check-off-box-incensus-2020-form%e7%be%8e%e5%9c%8b%e7%9c%be%e8%ad%b0%e9%99%a2%e5%a4%96%e4%ba%
a4%e5%a7%94/
Liu, R.-Y. (2012). Language Policy and Group Identification in Taiwan. Mind, Brain &
Education, 6(2), 108–116. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-228X.2012.01143.x
Lu, H. (2002). The politics of locality : making a nation of communities in Taiwan. New York :
Routledge, 2002.
Lynch, D. (2002). Taiwan’s Democratization and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism as
Socialization to Global Culture. Pacific Affairs, 75(4), 557–574.
https://doi.org/10.2307/4127346
Lynch, D. C. (2008). Chapter 6: TAIWAN: DEMOCRATIZATION AS DE-SINIFICATION. In
Rising China & Asian Democratization (pp. 150–180). Stanford University Press. Retrieved
from http://0-

82

search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=50339922&
site=eds-live&scope=site
Magat, M. (2015). From rebounds to three-pointers: Linsanity, racial insults, and stereotypes in
flux. Journal of American Folklore, (510), 438.
Makeham, J. (2005). Cultural, ethnic, and political nationalism in contemporary Taiwan :
bentuhua. Basingstoke [u.a.]: Palgrave Macmillan.
Massey, C. G. (2016). Immigration quotas and immigrant selection. Explorations in Economic
History, 60, 21–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2015.11.001
McCabe, K. (2012, January 31). Taiwanese Immigrants in the United States. Retrieved
September 29, 2016, from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/taiwanese-immigrantsunited-states
Ministry of the Interior of ROC 內政部-英譯法規內容(外部版). (n.d.). Retrieved October 27,
2016, from http://glrs.moi.gov.tw/EngLawContent.aspx?Type=E&id=271
Model, S. (2015). “Falling Leaves Return To Their Roots”: Taiwanese-Americans Consider
Return Migration. Population Space & Place, 22(8), 781.
Ngai, M. M. (2004). Impossible subjects : illegal aliens and the making of modern America.
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [2004].
Ngai, M. M. (2006). Asian American History—Reflections on the De-centering of the Field.
Journal of American Ethnic History, 25(4), 97–108.
Nomura, H. (2010). Making the Japanese Empire: Nationality and Family Register in Taiwan,
1871-1899. Japanese Studies, 30(1), 67.
Open Doors | Institute of International Education. (n.d.). Retrieved November 14, 2016, from
http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors#.WCpNcNxvnfY

83

Our Mission. (2016, October 13). Retrieved from http://fapa.org/wp/mission/
Paletta, D., Lee, C. E., & Browne, A. (2016, December 3). Trump Spoke With Taiwan President
in Break With Decades of U.S. Policy. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from
http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-spoke-with-taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen1480718423
Petersen, W. (1966). Success story, Japanese-American style. New York Times Magazine, 20.
Roberts, C. M. (1971, April 29). US Suggests 2 Chinas Try Direct Discussions. Washington Post.
Rowen, I. (2015). Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a StudentOccupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region. The Journal of Asian Studies, 74(1), 5–
21. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911814002174
Royce, E. (2016, October 27). House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce Urges
Census Bureau To Add “Taiwanese” Check-Off Box In Census 2020 Form.
Schak, D. C. (2009). The development of civility in Taiwan. Pacific Affairs, 82(3), 447–465.
Simon, S. (2012). Politics and Headhunting among the Formosan Sejiq: Ethnohistorical
Perspectives. Oceania, 82(2), 164–185.
Su, C. (2014). From perpetual foreigner to national hero: a narrative analysis of US and
Taiwanese news coverage of Linsanity. Asian Journal of Communication, 24(5), 474–489.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2014.913640
Su, H.-Y. (2008). What does it mean to be a girl with qizhi?:Refinement, gender and language
ideologies in contemporary Taiwan. Journal of Sociolinguistics, (3), 334.
Taiwan relations act. [microform] : conference report to accompany H.R. 2479. (1979).
[Washington] : [U.S. Govt. Print. Off], [1979].

84

Thies, W. j., & Bratton, P. c. (2004). When governments collide in the Taiwan Strait. Journal of
Strategic Studies, 27(4), 556–584. https://doi.org/10.1080/1362369042000314510
Tourism Statistics | Japan Tourism Marketing Co. (n.d.). Retrieved October 13, 2016, from
http://www.tourism.jp/en/statistics/
Truman Library - Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman. (1949). Retrieved
September 28, 2016, from
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1352&st=&st1=
Truman Library - Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman. (1950). Retrieved
September 28, 2016, from
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=800&st=formosa&st1=status
U. S. Census Bureau. (2015). American Community Survey 2015. Retrieved October 25, 2016,
from
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_
1YR_S0201&prodType=table
U.S. Census Bureau. (2010). US Census Bureau 2010 Census. Retrieved November 22, 2016,
from http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/
United States. (1990). The President’s report on the U.S. military presence in East Asia:
hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred
First Congress, second session, April 19, 1990. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the
Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, U.S. G.P.O. Retrieved from
//catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007602609
Wang, C. (2013). Transpacific articulations. [electronic resource] : student migration and the
remaking of Asian America. Honolulu : University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2013. Retrieved from

85

http://0search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00548a&AN=iusf.b
2534735&site=eds-live&scope=site
Weis, L., & Dolby, N. (2012). Social class and education. [electronic resource] : global
perspectives. New York : Routledge, 2012. Retrieved from http://0search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00548a&AN=iusf.b
2059257&site=eds-live&scope=site
Weller, R. P. (2001). Alternate civilities : democracy and culture in China and Taiwan. Boulder,
Colo. : Westview Press, 2001.
Wilson, R. S. (2009). Making Hakka spaces: resisting multicultural nationalism in Taiwan.
Identities, 16(4), 414–437.
Wu, M. (2009). Language Planning and Policy in Taiwan: Past, Present, and Future. Working
Papers in Educational Linguistics, 24(2), 99–118.
Xu, X. (2006). Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight: China’s national identity and the
2008 Beijing Olympiad. Sociological Review, 54, 90–107. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467954X.2006.00655.x
Zhang Yanxian. (2009). Nation-state Building and the study of Taiwan’s History Under Japanese
Rule. Chinese Studies in History, 42(4), 43–51.
Zhong, Y. (2016). Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan. Journal of Contemporary China,
25(99), 336–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1104866
公告：Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend Distribution in
Taiwan(1992/06~2016/06) - Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. (2016).
Retrieved November 19, 2016, from http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167

86

Appendix A: Interview Questions
1) When did you and/or family initially move from Taiwan to the US?
2) What brought them to the US?
3) Do you by any chance know your family’s history from China to Taiwan?
4) Have you been to Taiwan? How often? Why?
5) Would you ever consider living in Taiwan long-term? Can you tell me why you would
want to?
6) Have you travelled other places? Can you tell me about your travels?
7) Are you involved in any local Taiwanese Associations? Do you participate in the
Taiwanese community?
8) What do you do there, what kind of activities are held there?
9) Have you learned any Chinese languages, which ones, how did you learn them, was
family involved, etc.?
10) How important is it to maintain these languages, how has it been beneficial to you?
11) Do you keep track of current events in Taiwan?
12) In your opinion, what makes being Taiwanese different from being Chinese, if you think
there is a difference at all?
13) Do you go out of your way to correct people when they call you Chinese American?
14) What do you think of Taiwan’s political status?
15) What would you like to see Taiwan become?
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